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ABSTRACT 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union all the peoples of the form.er Soviet 
Union had experienced serious changes in the political, cultural, economic spheres, 
and simply in daily life. It is necessary to confess that the country is still living in a 
kind of ideological vacuum. It is early to say that the republics have been able to 
manage to shift from totalitarian regime to the democratic one, and the democracy has 
been firmly established in all republics. There is a search for the convenient ideology, 
that can combine democratic principles with the old state traditions, cultural and 
religious peculiarities. 
Today the general important feature proper to the all Muslim republics is the 
rise of Islam. The revival of Islam started with the early years of perestroika, today 
reached significant dimension. The appeal to Islam is a characteristic of many 
political groups in the Muslim republics of the Russian Federation. A religious revival 
is a complex social phenomenon that can be studied from various angles. On one hand 
it is return to the traditional Muslim values through the practicing Islam, as an every-
day fact, on the other hand it is rise of political Islam. Both aspects of the revival of 
Islam are present today in the Muslim republics of the Russian Federation. A 
rediscovery of Islamic roots is under way in all the Muslim republics of the Russian 
Federation. 
The aim of this research is to highlight the recent political developments in the 
Muslim republics of the Russian Federation. In this work I tried to find an answer to 
such questions as: Can Islam serve as the ideological basis for the unification of the 
Muslim peoples of Russia, as it was at the beginning of this century? Do the Muslims 
of Russia have a sense of corporate identity, and, if so, to what extent can the Muslims 
of Russia be regarded as one entity? 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of Muslims who consider 
themselves believers increased substantially. High interest towards the religion 
among the population lead to the significant increase in the number of the mosques, 
religious establishments, political parties along the religious lines. Today there are 
two officially registered Muslim parties of all-union character , operating in Russia. 
This gradually accumulated but restrained political potential will sooner or 
later reveal itself forcing the Muslims of Russia to make step further. Today is the 
stage of regaining of lost values, the stage of common actions will come next. There 
can be little doubt that eventually the Muslim political organizations will convince the 
Muslim nations of advantages of cooperation. 
ii 
With some 22 million of Muslim population living within its borders, Russia 
is one of the world's major Muslim countries. Forming the large family of 
nationalities the Muslim peoples of Russia represent a very substantial part of the 
Islamic world . 
The Muslim peoples of the Russian Federation came under Russian rule as a 
result of the expansionist policy of the Tsarist Empire. Today after ethnic Russians, 
Muslims constitute the second largest population group of the Russian Federation. 
There are seven Muslim regions in Russia; in the Volga-Ural region there are 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan Republics, in the North Caucasus there are Republic of 
Dagestan, lngush Republic, Karachay-Cherkes Republic, Kabartay-Balkar Republic 
and Adygey .1 
Analyzing the history of the Muslims of Russia, it is easy to notice the 
importance of religion in the historical development and the process of formation of 
the national identity among the Muslims of Russia. It was due to Islam that the 
Muslim peoples could preserve for centuries their cultural and ethnic individualism in 
the oppressing, Russian-dominated environment. In addition to the faithful 
attachment to their religion, the ability to survive as a distinct community in the 
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hostile environment makes the Muslims of Russia a umque and peculiar 
phenomenon. 
Until recently, the historians and the scholars of Islam focused their studies on 
the Muslim world outside the Russian Federation. Though the history of the Muslim 
peoples of the Russian Federation represents a particular interest for a wide range of 
scholars, the history of the Muslim political associations has been the subject of very 
few scholarly studies in the West and even in Russia itself. 
A close and detailed study of the Muslims of Russia and political 
associations they formed has become necessary for the proper understanding of the 
political developments that are currently taking place in the Muslim republics of the 
Russian Federation. 
Taking into account the shortage of inquiries concerning the present political 
life of the Muslims of the Russian Federation, I saw the necessity to highlight the 
recent political dynamics that have occurred in the Muslim communities of the 
Russian Federation after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The aim of this 
research is to produce a comprehensive analysis of the political potential of the 
Muslims of Russia. More precisely, this study analyzes the potential of the Muslims 
of Russia to represent a united political force, as it was before the Revolution. 
In this work I tried to fmd an answer to such questions as: do the Muslims of 
Russia have a sense of corporate identity, and, if so, to what extent can the Muslims 
of Russia be regarded as one entity? Can Islam serve as the ideological basis for the 
unification of the Muslim peoples of Russia, as it was at the beginning of this 
century? 
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Although this research is devoted to the study of the Muslim community of 
Russia, this paper does not deal either with dogma or philosophy of Islam. But, since 
the title of the research is "The Muslims Political Movements of Russia as a Potential 
Political Force'', the term Muslim, used in the context of this paper, requires some 
comments. One of the most complicated problem that the researcher faces during the 
studying of the Muslim population of Russia, is the concept and the usage of the 
word Muslim in Russia. 
Who are the Muslims of Russia? Is it just a religious community of believers 
without any political or ethnic peculiarities, or is it a mosaic of nationalities and ethnic 
minorities who have serious political aspirations and demands, but for their common 
attachment to the religion and culture of Islam, they remain first of all Muslim? In 
many cases the word Muslim is used in Russia as an identification, not an affirmation 
of religious beliefs, in some cases it is just the opposite. There are also Muslims "by 
nationality", or "by heart" like the Kazan Tatars or Chechens. In other words, 
membership of a certain nationality means automatically that a person must worship 
Islam. Despite this there are fierce atheists and convicted communists among the 
Kazan Tatars and other Muslim nations, peoples who are completely indifferent to 
the practice of religion, at the same time there are some peoples among the Russians 
or other nationalities who became Muslim , and diligently observe all the duties of 
Islam. 
In addition to the vast Muslim settlements in Siberia, Far East and other 
provinces, there are large Muslim communities in Moscow, St.Petersburg and many 
other purely "Russian" cities and provinces. The Muslims among the groups of the 
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consistent non-Russian population of Moscow stay on the second place after the 
Ukrainians, and on the third place in St.Petersburg after the Ukrainians and Jews.2 In 
short, the boundary between what is considered to be Muslim or non-Muslim is not 
fixed by the Islam but rather by Muslims themselves. To reflect the true nature of the 
Muslim community of Russia, the word Muslim in this research is used as a common 
name for all the distinct non-Russian national minorities of Russia who belong to the 
Islamic culture. So, to avoid misperceptions, the meaning of Muslim must be viewed 
within this context. 
The study is divided into four parts. The first chapter deals with the history of 
the pre-revolutionary Muslim political movements. I used pre-revolutionary political 
experience of the Muslims of Russia as a case to demonstrate the process of the 
formation of Islamic political consciousness among the Muslim peoples of Russia. 
The creation of the All-Russian-Muslim movements such as the ''Union of Muslims" 
or lttifaq-1-Miislimin to defend political rights of the Muslim subjects of the empire, 
was one of the most significant moments in the history of the Muslim peoples of 
Russia. The present political situation in the Muslim republics of Russia, is a logical 
consequence of the political past, memories of which still alive in the minds of the 
Muslim peoples. 
This study analyzes the political potential of the Muslims of Russia. Therefore 
I found it necessary to study in detail not only the common features, consistent parts 
of this potential, but also the obstructive factors that weaken the political potential of 
the Muslims of Russia. Among the obstacles reducing the possibility of common 
action is the division of the Muslim nations into the administrative units. The second 
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chapter of the research deals with these issues. All the autonomous republics of the 
Russian Federation in their present form are the products of the Soviet period. The 
administrative frontiers of the Muslim republics were drawn in such a manner as to 
create a border dispute and confrontation among the neighboring Muslim republics. 
This factor obstructs the peaceful collaboration among the various Muslim republics. 
The political and administrative transformations that took place in the Muslim regions 
during the Soviet rule left a profound, if not dramatic, impact on national and 
religious identity of the Muslim nations of Russia. Another negative phenomenon 
inherent in all the Muslim republics is the communist nomenclatura. The common 
~ 
feature of these soviet-style leaders is the pathological fear of Moscow. Putting the 
interests of the federal authorities before the interests of their own republics, the 
national communists in the Muslim republics stay very aloof and apathetic to the 
demands of their peoples. I argue in this chapter that the social, political, cultural 
changes that the Muslim peoples have undergone in the past seventy years, 
tremendously increased the gap between the Muslim nations, once united and kindred. 
However it would be wrong to assume that the situation is desperate. There is 
one factor that can overpower all these impeding post-communist realities, it is a 
general revival of Islam. Part three investigates the process of Islamic and national 
revival at the local level, within the context of regional and national movements. I 
tried to estimate the role and place of Islam in the political aspirations of these 
republics by examining different political movements operating in the Muslim 
republics of the Russian Federation. The strength of the Islamic factor can be 
s 
measured through the political demands of the various popular movements and parties 
operating in the ethnic republics. 
The first attempt to represent the interests of the Muslims of the Russian 
Federation in the all-union scale, has been made with the formation of some union-
based Muslim political parties. Keeping in mind the transnational character of Islam, 
these parties are seeking popular support and have serious political ambitions, one of 
which is the creation of the Muslim Fraction in the State Duma. The fact that the 
Muslims of Russia made an effort to unite, is an indicator of possible political 
developments within the Muslim community of Russia. Part four of the research 
~ 
represents the analysis of these political movements. 
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the present political situation in the 
Muslim regions of Russia and to examine the potential of these separated Muslim 
communities to unite under the single ideology. In short, this study addresses several 
issues: first, the current political problems and atmosphere in the Muslim republics; 
secondly, the level and magnitude of religious revival in the Muslim republics; 
thirdly, the scope of activities of the Muslim parties operating on the all-Russian 
scale, and the review of the present political potential of the Muslims of Russia. 
Though the divided Muslim peoples of Russia have not shown yet that they 
are willing to unite to struggle for a common goal, I personally believe that the 
present evolution will lead to the further reawakening of Islamic consciousness. 
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In order to understand the present situation in the Muslim community of 
Russia, it is necessary to look back at its history. Because many problems that agitate 
the Muslims of Russia today are similar to those that inspired them to unite at the 
beginning of this century. 
The history of the Muslim political movement has its roots in the 19th century, 
when a new group - intelligentsia emerged among the Muslim societies of Russia. 
But it would be wrong to assume, that throughout their history the Muslims of Russia 
were subjects of the Russian state without any real popular demands. From the very 
beginning the Muslim subjects of Russia, especially Tatars, have made numerous 
attempts to improve their conditions of life, openly confess religion, and raise their 
political and legal status.For a· long time these seeds of political liberalism did not 
find fertile ground to provide visible results, and only by the 19th century could the 
idea of political action be realized in practice. 
The nineteenth century, characterized by its political radicalism, technological 
boom, progressive thought and rise of the nationalism, was a turning point in the 
history of Russia. These favorable circumstances also served the interests of the 
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Muslims: information about the changing world and events reaching the Muslim 
communities, facilitated the formation of a new Islamic consciousness. For the first 
time, after the centuries of passive acquiescence to Russian domination Muslims of 
Russia had a chance to voice their aspirations openly. All the positive changes that 
occured in the nineteenth century in the Muslim community : technological advances, 
the rise of the press, growth of literacy, the emergence of new social groups such as 
intelligentsia, educated intellectuals, and the merchants, opened the doors to 
innovative thinking and paved the way for the future cultural, religious and 
educational reformism. 
Gradually, maturing politically and culturally in the the nineteenth century, 
Muslims, proved themselves quite capable of defending their own national and 
religious interests in the twentieth century. 
l.l.19th Century Reformism 
In the 19th century the Muslims of Russia were at different stages of political 
development, religious affiliation and social structure. Freedom-loving North 
Caucasian Muslims, lately invaded to the Russian Empire, fiercely resisted the 
Russian invasion, Muslims of Central Asia, nomadic in genesis, somnolently roamed 
throughout the vast expanses of Asian steppes, (time by time engaged in tribal and 
clan's affairs,) Azerbaijanis became involved in industrial development, and the 
Kazan Tatars, most westernized and developed Muslim nation of Russia, were 
preoccupied with cultural and educational reforms. 
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Despite all these differences, Muslims of Russia had one thing in common: 
they were deeply conscious of their religious affiliation, which later stimulated the 
growing awareness of religious unity among them. 
The first innovations that appear in the Muslim community of Russia in the 
19th century were mostly on the religious and cultural platform. The reformist 
movement was started by the Kazan Tatars. Due to the substantial level of cultural, 
social and economic development, the Tatars became the political and cultural leaders 
of the Muslims of Russia and pioneers of the Muslim reformist movement in the 19th 
century. 
The Muslim reformism is indebted to the intellectual climate of Kazan. Due to 
its intensive intellectual life, the city of Kazan became one of the prominent cultural 
and political centers of the Muslim world. In the 19th century, the Kazan Tatars were 
among the most advanced members of Islamic community in the field of education 
and Islamic theology.Tatar religious thinkers such as Ebu Nasrr el-Kiirsevi (1771-
1812) and Sehabettin Mercani (1818-1889) made serious attempts to clear Islam of 
the religious dogmas that dominated religious thinking at that time. Thus Mercani 
believed that Islam religion could harmonize perfectly with the modem science. 
Another prominent Muslim thinker was Kayyum Nastri (1824-1902). Being a brilliant 
linguist and philologist, he wrote numerous books on ethnography, geography, 
physics and other subjects, enlightening and inspiring in this way his Muslim 
contemporaries. With four thousand published scholastic works, Nastri was the most 
active Muslim thinker and writer of his time. 3 The number of scholastic books written 
by the Tatar reformers reflected the intellectual level of the Tatar society. 
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The Tatars had obtained their first license to print Muslim religious books in 
Russia after the enactment of liberal legislation by Catherine 11,and by 1802 some 
14 300 copies of such books,including the Koran,had been printed. Fifty years 
later,during the period 1853-1859,Kazan University alone published 326 700 
copies of Koran and other books in Tatar, and by the decade 1854-1864 the 
number of books published by Tatars exceeded one million.4 
The books printed in Kazan were circulated not only in the Muslim regions of 
Russia but also were exported abroad, to Turkistan, Hiva, Buhara and even India. 5 
Success in the cultural and scholastic spheres achieved by the Tatars in the first half of 
the 19th century, worried Orthodox missionaries. 
In the second half of the 19th century the Russian government launched 
another rampant campaign of Russification and Christianization. During the 19th 
century Russification became official dynastic policy. The new school system 
designed by the Russian educator Ilminsky attempted to provide education in Russian. 
The final aim of this educational reform was the rapprochement (sblizheniye) between 
the Russians and Tatars, which would lead to the assimilation of the Tatars. The 
responce of the Tatar intellectuals to the Tsarist government's attempt to convert them 
to Christianity through the Russian language was sophisticated and intelligent. This 
response was the modernist Jadid (reformist) movement.. 
By the end of the 19th century Tatar scholars and intellectuals became aware 
that the old-style Tatar educational system based on religious teaching could not keep 
pace with the rapidly changing environment. The traditional educational system based 
on memorizing religious subjects. In these Islamic establishments neither secular 
subjects nor Russian language were taught. With the main goal to prepare religious 
figures, this educational system could not answer the real needs of the contemporary 
society. There was a need for a secular Tatar school. The progressive Tatar 
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intellectuals understood that in order to survive they had to regain intellectual and 
economic equality with the Russians preserving Islam as the basis of Tatar society , 
and only proper educational reform could speed up the process of transformation of a 
traditional society into the modem one. Otherwise, without the essential prerequisites 
of the contemporary modem society, the weak and backward Muslim peoples of the 
Russian Empire would be doomed. The Tatar concern with secular education and 
promotion of science was a good indicator of their willingness to take part in all 
spheres of life within the Russian state. 
The Muslims of Crimea and the Volga-Ural region took initiative and 
provided leadership for the cultural and intellectual revival of the Muslims within 
Russia. The first man who introduced reforms to the Muslim community of Russia 
was a Crimean Tatar intellectual named Ismail Bey Gasprrab. Gasprrab (1851-1914) 
was one of the most outstanding figures in the political history of the Turko-Muslim 
peoples of Russia. Well-educated and European-minded, Gasprral1 firmly believed 
that the future development of the Muslim nations depends on the quality of 
educational standards. As a start, Gasprral1 offered a new method of instructions to the 
traditional mektebs and medreses in Russia. He introduced mathematics, history, and 
geography to the curriculum of these schools, though without challenging the study 
of Koran as fundamental for the Muslims.With the improvement of the quality of 
education, the number of new method schools rapidly increased.By the end of the 19th 
century in the Kazan gubemiya there were 1.21 schools and 55 students per thousand 
Tatars, for every thousand Russians this proportion was 0.88 schools and 40 
students.6 
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As a result of the development of the Tatar schools, there were 25 000 of them by 
1912, and the rate ofliteracy among the Tatars before the revolution was only slightly less 
than among the Russians. 7 
This new system of education with a wide range of secular subjects, 
challenged the obsolete, traditional, narrow way of acquiring knowledge, widening 
the outlook of the pupils and bringing to them a new understanding of reality. Later 
these new method reforms, Usul-u-jadid turned to the general movement of 
intellectual awakening among the Muslims of Russia. Usul-u-jadid became the slogan 
of progressive Tatar intellectuals, and they themselves began to be called Jadids. 
Gasprrab' s activities were not limited just by educational reforms. He 
continually visited other Muslim regions of Russia, enlightening and inspiring his 
coreligionists. Tercuman the first newspaper, published in Turkish language and 
intended to embrace all of the Muslim peoples in Russia, was also brought about by 
Gasprrab. Besides the propaganda activities, Tercuman interpreted on its pages all 
developments of the Muslim community in Russia and in the Muslim world, and soon 
become the most influential newspaper among the Muslims of Russia. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, at least, it had subscribers and an audience in 
virtually every comer of the Turkic world, and even beyond. To this day, no other periodical 
has achieved such an "all-Turkic" interest and distribution in any way comparable to 
Terciiman. 8 
With genuine devotion Gasprrab served the cause of Muslim cultural and 
religious unity. He understood that only unity and solidarity could help the Muslims 
of Russia to preserve their Turkic identity and Muslim faith. Gasptra11' s reforms were 
dedicated to the creation of the national unity of the Muslim Turkic peoples of the 
Russian Empire on the basis of common ethno-religious and linguistic consciousness. 
The ideology of Gasp1rab can be summed up in his famous phrase ''unity of 
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language, thought, and action." 9 The general political program of Gasprah 
concentrated upon such issues as: development of national schools, through 
educational reforms, creation of special foundations to provide financial assistance to 
the educational centers, modernization of the traditional Muslim way of life, and 
emancipation of Muslim women. 10 
At the end of the 19th century Gasprrah became the most popular and 
influential Turkish leader in Russia. Gasprrah was a shrewd and pragmatic reformist, 
he never advocated measures that could lead to a confrontation between the Russian 
state and Muslim minorities. He aimed to transform the Muslim Turks living in 
Russian Empire into a modem nation with all its attributes. This transformation could 
only be achieved through socio-cultural reforms, and the starting point of these 
reforms had to be the establishment of a common literary language.( The common 
language for the Muslims of Russia could be Turkic language). Bu due to the 
difference in dialects, the attempts to create one common Turkic literary language was 
unsuccessful. 
1.2. The Union of Muslims of Russia, Itti.faq-i-Muslimin 
Eventually, by the end of the 19th century, politically oriented circles 
appeared in many Muslim areas. Those Muslim intellectuals who acquired liberal 
education and acquainted themselves with political and intellectual currents, 
naturally were involved into the realm of politics. Many Jadids became associated 
with the Russian liberal movement and progressive circles. On the eve of the 
Revolution of 1905, the general mood of the Muslims of Russia seriously reflected all 
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the drama of the political situation in the country. At the same time, separated from 
each other and disoriented by the surrounding chaos, the Muslims did not have any 
concrete plan of political action in the face of impending events. In spite the reformist 
movements in the 19th and early 20th centuries religious conservatism dominated in 
many Muslim regions, and many Muslims preferred to refrain from the manifestation 
of political affiliation and participation in any liberal movement. Another extreme was 
the inclination of some Muslim activists to join socialist revolutionary parties 
elevating class struggle above national issues. In both cases, historical circumstances 
inevitably forced Muslims together with other peoples in Russia to take further steps. 
It was during this period that serious steps toward the unity of the Turko-Muslims of 
the Russian Empire on a political platform was taken, and, to a certain extent,such a unity 
was realized.Inspite of interruptions and important exceptions, a political movement 
encompassing all the Turks of the Empire came into being.11 
One by one Muslim delegations from various Muslim regions arrived to 
St.Petersburg presenting their petitions to the government officials. The basic need of 
the Muslim peoples living in Russia were more or less similar, therefore the question 
of common action was put on the agenda. It is natural that during this reactionary and 
turbulent period, the Muslims of Russia urgently felt the need of political unification. 
Again, the Tatars were in the forefront of the liberal movement providing ideas and 
leadership for other Muslim nations of Russia. Abdiirreshid lbrahimov, former emigre 
journalist, formed in St.Petersburg a Muslim political group where he laid the 
foundation of the future all-Russian Muslim movements. Many wealthy Muslim 
businessmen such as Huseyinov, Tagiev lent their full financial support to the 
common Muslim cause. After several preliminary meetings in Kazan and Ufa, it was 
decided to prepare all necessary arrangements for the forthcoming grand meeting of 
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all the Muslims of Russia. According to the arrangements the All-Russian Muslim 
Congress would be held in August in Nizhniy Novgorod. 
Although organizators could not obtain the official permission to convene a 
meeting, the first congress of all-Russian Muslims was hold on 28 August 1905 in 
Nizhniy Novgorod during its annual fair. 12 Due to the refusal of the government 
officials to get permission, the steamboat Gustav Struve was rented and under the 
pretext of pleasure excursion the first All-Russian Muslims congress was realized. 
Nearly one hundred and forty Tatar and Azerbaijani delegates participated in the 
congress. The congress confirmed the principal aim of its participants, that is the 
creation of a political union ( Jttifaq ) of all the Muslims of Russia. The following 
resolutions made in the congress, reflected the aspirations and basic demands of the 
Muslim delegates: 
1. Unification of Muslim citizens of Russia for the purpose of carrying out political, 
economic, and social reforms. 
2. Establishment of constitutional monarchy, based on proportional representation of 
nationalities. 
3. Legal equality of the Muslim and Russian populations. 
4. Freedom of press, convention, and religion. 
5. Establishment of regional councils ( mahalli meclis) to act on behalf of the 
regular Muslim congresses. 13 
Two months later, following the October Manifesto, the political climate in 
Russia changed favorably, and the Muslims, along with other parties could carry on 
their activities openly on a legal basis. The liberties brought about by the famous 
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October Manifesto of 1905, provided the Muslims of Russia appropriate ground for 
the establishment of political organizations and spreading their activities. 
Immediately, on January 1906, the second All-Russian Muslim Congress was 
held in St.Petersburg. In this congress the participants voted unanimously for the 
establishment of the official Union of the Muslims of Russia, lttifaq-z-Muslimin , or 
simply lttifaq, and every delegate swore on the Koran to work on behalf of the Union. 
Another issue on the agenda of the Congress was a selection of the Russian party to 
cooperate with in the elections. The Congress resolved to cooperate with the Russian 
K.adets ( Constitutional Democrats ) in the elections to the first Russian Parliament, 
Dum 14 a. 
As a result of propaganda activities and skillful cooperation with the Kadets, 
the Muslims gained 25 seats in the elections to the First Duma. The Muslim 
representatives from the Crimea, Kazan, Caucasus, Turkestan and Kazak lands were 
sent to the first Russian highest legislative organ. 15 
The first Russian representative organ, Duma was opened on May 1906. 
Unfortunately, the parliamentary experience of the Muslim deputies did not last for a 
long. Promising so much, and arousing great hopes, the First Duma was short-lived, 
and on July 1906 it was dissolved. Nevertheless, such a revolutionary innovation, 
gave incredible motivation to the Muslim peoples and social and political activities in 
the Muslim areas increased. 
On August 16-21, 1906 the third and the most notable Muslim Congress was 
held in Nizhniy Novgorod. It was a very representative forum. With some 800 
delegates from all the Muslim regions of the Russian Empire, it was the largest 
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Mm.Im Congress ever held. 16 Being the first Muslim Congress officially authorized 
by the government, it was observed by the Russian and Turkish press. The main issue 
cm the agenda of the Congress was the formation of the political party out of the 
Muslim Union. The Muslim Union was an alliance, not a political party, therefore, to 
act properly on the Russian political scene, there was a need for an official legal 
political party. Despite some disagreements, about the ideology and nature of the 
party , the Congress adopted a decision to create political party based on national and 
religious principles. The basic nature of the party is well reflected in the Y.Ak~ura's 
speech responding to the Socialist Revolutionaries objections: ''There should be 
unions based on principles of nationality and ethnic origin; despite economic 
differences,it is always possible to unite and organize the most powerful party on 
principles of nationalism and religion".17 The party program demanded legal equality 
of the Muslims with the Russians, cultural autonomy, parity of all religions, 
reorganization of education for the Muslims, constitutional arrangements.18 Articles 
concerning economic and agrarian issues, were in line with the Kadets economic 
theories. In general, the political program of the lttifaq, consisting of seventy-two 
articles, was very close to the Kadets political platform. 
Another important issue discussed and adopted on the Congress was the 
educational program. The program demanded the uniformity of education throughout 
the Muslim regions on the basis of the ''New Method" reforms. According to the 
program, in the elementary school the language of instruction should be the local 
dialect , and later on the high school level, one common Turkish language, i.e. 
Ottoman Turkish must be introduced. 19 
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Despite the moderation of the political program, it was evident that the 
ultimate political goal of the Muslims of Russia was the elimination of imperial 
influence and Russian domination. The Muslims, led by the Tatars, were definitely 
determined to use this historical opportunity to make up for lost time and gain long-
awaited momentum. 
Again the successful collaboration with the Kadets (the only party that 
accepted the cultural and national program of the Muslims) resulted in an increase in 
the number of seats gained in the elections to the Second Duma. The Muslims sent 39 
representatives to the Second Duma. 20 The Second Duma, unlike the first one, was 
dominated by the leftist parties. But the Muslim deputies together with the Kadets 
also showed themselves as active supporters of the governmental reforms. 
After the initial opening of the Second Duma, Azerbaijani deputy Ali Merdan 
Top~ub~1 appealed to the Muslim deputies with the idea to form a separate Muslim 
fraction within the Duma. 21 The majority of the deputies responded to this call, and 
only six deputies belonging to the socialist group formed their own bloc. The Muslim 
deputies in the Second Duma paid special attention to the problem of land reforms. 
The point of disagreement between two Muslim groups was the question of land 
reform. The socialist Muslim deputies advocated free distribution of the land to the 
peasants, whereas the Muslim Fraction along with the Kadets supported long-term 
land tenure. 
Another important question that disturbed the Muslims in the Second Duma 
was Russia's colonization policy. The deputies from Turkestan were very concerned 
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about the incidence and scope of settlements of Russian population in the Muslim 
regions. 
Unfortunately, the Second Duma repeated the fate of the former one. After 
several months it was dissolved for being irreconcilable to government policy. 
Again, to the misfortune of the Muslim deputies, the life of the Duma had been too 
short to make any serious political accomplishments. 
But outside the Duma, the scope of reforms, accompanied by the outburst of 
national press and schools, reached vigorous dimensions and touched even the remote 
places inhabited by Muslims. Although Muslim reformists refrained from the open 
national and political agitation, all these rapid developments showed that the Muslims 
had become a serious political force, that alarmed the Russian officials. Imperial 
Russia never tolerated any open political activity directed at weakening its 
supranational structure. 
To avoid further incidents compromising governmental policies, the electoral 
law was reshaped. This new electoral system deprived the Central Asian region of the 
electoral right and severely restricted the number of representatives from other 
Muslim regions. As a result, only 10 Muslim deputies were represented in the Third 
Duma and, as it was in the Second Duma, the Muslims formed their own 
parliamentary fraction. The Third Duma was more conservative and nationalistic in its 
composition. Under these conditions it was very difficult for the Muslim deputies to 
realize their progressive ideas. The Kadets, political partners of the Muslims from the 
previous assemblies, also did not have enough seats to form a powerful bloc. 
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Despite these obstacles, the Muslim fraction and individual Muslim deputies 
of the Third Duma acted cohesively for the common cause of the Muslims of Russia. 
The main issues raised by the Muslim deputies during the sessions of the Third Duma 
were the legal equality of the Muslims subjects of the Empire, underepresentation of 
Muslims in the legislative organs, valaf question. the right of the Muslims to educate 
their children in the national schools, and problems with Christianization. The 
presence of strong Russian nationalist elements and Orthodox clergy in the Third 
Duma lead to new attempts to russify non-Russian subjects of the empire. In response, 
the Muslim deputies challenged to the flagrant attacks of the ultra-right Russian 
deputies and expressed their protest in series of impressive speeches, but it was the 
only thing they could do. 22 Being a weak minority they were alienated by the hostile 
and aggressive atmosphere of the Third Duma, and they could not possibly have 
achieved any considerable result. 
The Muslim Fraction of the Fourth Duma was consisted of only six deputies; 
five of them from the Volga-Ural region. The political composition of the Fourth 
Duma was even more unpromising than the previous one, so all the hopes connected 
with the legal achievements on behalf of the Muslims came to the end. The desperate 
fate of the Muslim fraction in the Duma showed that open manifestations of the 
political aspirations of the Muslims were doomed to failure. 
In summary; although the October Manifesto brought liberal reforms and the 
Muslims were given an opportunity to stand up for their rights in political platform, 
in reality things seemed much more difficult. Gradually, this euphoria abated and, 
after the dissolution of two Dumas, the reactionary regime again resumed repressive 
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measures throughout the Russian empire. During this period many Muslim 
progressive thinkers and reformist were forced to leave the country and carry on their 
work abroad. During the last years of the Tsarist regime the Muslims of Russia found 
themselves in the turbulent maelstrom of events. Repression, violence, strikes, 
demonstrations; revolutionary unrest reached unprecedented dimensions keeping the 
exhausted country in the constant feverish agony. The absolute monarchy in Russia 
entered into its final stage. 
The Muslims of the Russian empire did not remain aloof from the 
revolutionary activities of their Russian counterparts. As it was mentioned earlier 
some of the Muslim reformists, strongly inspired and influenced by the socialist 
doctrines, joined the socialist camp. Many Muslims enthusiastically participated in 
revolutionary actions believing that only common solidarity of all oppressed peoples 
of the empire could overthrow the tyranny of Tsarism. The enlargement of the 
radical left, particularly noticeable among the Tatars, Bashkirs and Azebaijanis, later 
led to their dissent from the traditional nationalist reformers. 
Nevertheless, regardless of their ideological affiliations, the Muslims of Russia 
welcomed the fall of the monarchy. Everybody believed that a new era of democratic 
reconstruction of Russian Empire had begun, promising a happy future for all the 
peoples of Russia. As though confirming these expectations the provisional 
government introduced some significant liberal legislation on ethnic minorities; one 
of them was a decree by which all peoples of Russia were given an equal status. 23 
It is an incontestable fact, that despite all of their political differences 
Muslims of Russia continued to be united by the religion and culture of Islam. That 
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is why, immediately after the Februmy Revolution, the Muslims were among the first 
to react, and the question of Islamic unity was again raised in the post-Revolutionary 
agenda. This time the Muslim leaders started working with even greater enthusiasm 
and justified excitement, anticipating the long-awaited fulfillment of their goals. 
To defme further objectives and new plan of actions it was decided to 
convene an All Muslim Congress as soon as possible. The Congress held in 
Moscow on May 1917 was in real terms All-Russian Muslim Congress, because not 
only Turkic but all the Muslim nationalities of Russia were invited to it. The 900 
delegates that participated in this Congress far exceeded the number of 450 that had 
been originally expected. 24 Kazan Tatars and the moderate right-wing dominated the 
Congress. An atmosphere full of joy and enthusiasm, encouraged the delegates to 
reach unanimity on most of the points. The Congress's agenda included a range of 
problems from the reconstruction of the Muslim Ecclesiastic Administration to 
cultural autonomy for the Muslims. 25 
When the head of the Foreign Religious Bureau of the Ministry of Interior and 
Commissar of the Department of Alien Religions S.A.Kotlyarevskiy, speaking on 
behalf of the Provisional Government, concentrated only on religious issues, some 
delegates (Ayaz Ishaki and Gali Merdan To~ub~1) were quick to notice that the 
spectrum of problems of Muslims of Russia were not limited only by religious issues 
and could not be viewed just through the prism of religion. In his speech Ayaz Ishaki 
expressed his criticism and pointed out that the Muslims of Russia had needs more 
serious and urgent than religious ones. 26 After heated debate an important resolution 
concerning structural organization of the Russian state was passed by the Congress. 
22 
This resolution was adopted by the majority vote ( 446 against 271) and favored 
democratic reconstruction of the Russian Empire into a federal state divided into 
national-territorial units. 27 Among the supporters of the federal system based on 
territorial autonomy were such prominent intellectuals as Zeki Velidi Togan, Hadi 
Maksudi, Fatih Kerimi, Ali Merdan Towub~1, and Resulzade.28 In his response to 
the Dagistani Social-Democrat Ahmad Tsalikov, who was against the creation of the 
territorial autonomies on the ground that it would divide the Muslims of Russia, the 
Azerbaijani leader Resulzade made a meaningful speech: 
In the future, in my opinion, Russia should be a federation consisting of autonomous 
territories. Russia's future political organization must satisfy all of its peoples, each one of 
whom should have its own national home .... We want national Turkic autonomous local 
statehood (milli mahalli muhtariat) ..... To concretize my suggestions, I recommend the 
creation of autonomous Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Turkestan, Kazakhstan, etc., since all these 
people have their specific local particularities... Each of these autonomous states should 
govern its local affairs and have its own national administration ... For the purpose of 
coordinating the religious and cultural development of these autonomous territories an All-
Russian Muslim Council should be formed. 29 
The thesis of Resulzade found many supporters from different regions and 
fmally the resolution was adopted. The text of the resolution stated that the type of 
governmental structure that would best serve the interests of the Muslim peoples of 
Russia was: 
a) A democratic republic based on national, territorial-federative principles. Those 
Muslim peoples not possessing their own separate territory should be granted national-
cultural autonomy. 
b) To regulate and coordinate the cultural and religious affairs of the Muslim peoples 
of Russia, a Central Muslim administration should be created. 30 
The fact that the Muslim delegates did not adhere to similar political ideology, 
seriously impeded reaching a consensus on crucial matters such as the creation of a 
single political party. Despite this, the parties managed to achieve compromise on 
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almost all matters. Among the most noticeable achievements of the Congress was the 
creation of the common Muslim Council ( Milli Sura ). This organ, with local 
branches in each region, was to coordinate political activities. The resolution proposed 
by Ayaz. lshaki and concerning creation of a Muslim Council reads as follows: 
A central body to serve all the Muslims of Russia shall be created for the following 
purposes: in order to assure united and coordinated actions among all the political parties and 
organizations;in order to administer effectively the spiritual and cultural affairs of all the 
Muslim ethnic groups of Russia; in order to have power of legislation within its own 
jurisdiction. 31 
Great importance was also attached to such serious issues as the political and 
cultural autonomy of the Muslim areas, extension of the cultural and religious rights 
of the Muslim population, unification of all Muslim education throughout the Russian 
empire along Jadid lines, emancipation of women, abolishment of compulsory 
military obligations and creation of exclusively Muslim national military units . 32 The 
resolutions on these issues were accepted with few debates. 
Unfortunately, the lack of ideological unity among the various national groups 
represented in the Congress and later in the National Council, Sura, worsened the 
situation, provoking further tension and clashes. The fact that many of the Muslim 
delegates were fervent proponents of the Social Democrats and revolutionary left, 
while others belonged to the pan-Turkic nationalist bloc, caused them to see the 
problems from different perspective, which later deepened the division between 
them. 
The Second All-Russian Muslim Congress was held in Kaz.an in July 1917. 
This meeting was dominated by the Tatars, because the Central Asians and the Azeris 
boycotted the Congress due to their unwillingness to cooperate with the Tatars.33 
During this session the extraterritorial autonomy of "all the Muslims of central Russia 
24 
and Siberia", based on the project of cultural and national autonomy, elaborated by 
Sadri Maksudi, was proclaimed. 34 The administrative and governing organs of the 
autonomy were to be the National Parliament (Milli Mejlis) and the Muslim 
Ecclesiastic Administration located in Ufa. 35 
Simultaneously with the Second All-Russian Muslim Congress, the Muslim 
Military Congress was convened in Kazan in July 1917. This Congress decided to 
create an All-Russian Muslim Central Military Council ( Barbi Sura ), under the 
chairmanship of I.Aikin, to organize Muslim military units. 36 The Barbi Sura 
managed to get permission from the government to form special Muslim units after 
which Muslim soldiers were drawn together. 37 
These developments were the last to take place before the October 
Revolution. Evolution of events continued after the Bolshevik Revolution too, but 
now in completely different direction. Though, later Muslim leaders raised the issue 
of the autonomous administration for different Muslim communities, the Bolshevik 
leadership refused to accept it, making everything taboo that could activate 
memories of the past. 
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2.1.The Phenomenon of Nomenclatura in the Muslim Republics of the 
Russian Federation 
The dramatic upheaval of October 26, 1917 changed the fate of the Muslims. 
Lenin's promise about self-determination and the right of secession was nothing but 
a deceptive tactical maneuver to win the support of the Muslim minorities. Hopes for 
national self-rule dimmed after the Revolution, when all the Muslim organizations 
such as Milli Sura, Millet Mejlisi, and Harbi Sura were dismantled. All the Muslim 
nations were thoroughly divided into the numerous artificial quasi-autonomies, 
subordinated to Moscow thereby frustrating their desire to unite and regain equality. 
By imposing "autonomous structures" on the Muslim nationalities, the Bolsheviks 
suppressed all the previous aspirations of the Muslims to consolidate, so long ripened 
and cherished by them. 
With the the stabilization of the Soviet regime the Soviet leaders subsequently 
demonstrated that they had no intention of allowing the national minorities to 
exercise the right to decide important internal matters in any sphere. Towards the end 
of the 1920's, Moscow started to oppose every manifestation of national 
individualism, and gradually, all Muslim national efforts and almost everything that 
has been achieved during the years before the revolution came to an end. 
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The post-revolutionary fate of the Muslim peoples of Russia was shaped 
within the framework of the so-called Nationalities Policy, and almost all the Muslim 
nations of Russia fell victim of this policy. The key of the Soviet success in imposing 
central control over the Muslim territories may be found in the Nationality Policy. 
The main objective of the Nationality Policy was the division of the Muslim 
community as far as possible, creation of the artificially drawn titular Autonomous 
Republics and regions, and isolation of different Muslim areas from one another and 
from outside influences. Five Muslim nations ( Crimean Tatars, Chechens, lngush, 
Karachay-Balkars, and Meskhetian Turks) were removed from their ancestral 
homelands and deported to the remote places in Central Asia and Siberia. 
To establish economic and technological dependency of the national 
peripheries upon Russia, the Soviets artificially divided the Muslim population on a 
great number of separate elements that had no direct links with one another. Since the 
October revolution, dozens of national formations have been created by the Kremlin 
leadership. The Soviets apparently considered the national aspirations of the Muslims 
of Russia satisfied by the creation of these autonomous republics. The problem of 
non-Russian minorities has been solved by retention of absolute power in the hands of 
the central authorities in Moscow. The final Sovietization of the Muslim nations was 
achieved by the co-optation of native elites who, by joining the "Communist class'', 
have become as alienated from the rest of their ethnic milieu as the Russian 
apparatchiks are. 
Moscow had no confidence in the political reliability of the old Muslim 
national communist intelligentsia, therefore the creation of new national cadres 
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loyal to Moscow was. imperative. To provide a standard governing apparatus 
everywhere and minimize the danger of the internal disorder, the Soviet system 
created the phenomenon of nomenclatura - nationless Communist partocrats. 
To defuse the unrest and mollify the intelligentsia it was necessary to make 
concessions in language policy and nativization of the apparatus of the republics. This 
nativization would provide the means for promoting workers, who were less educated and 
more dependent upon Stalin's machine, into leadership roles where they could then supplant 
th b . 11" . 38 e more o streperous mte 1gents1a. 
The Kremlin leadership realised that the only way to ensure effective control 
over the Muslim regions was to train an indigenous local Party and state bureaucracy 
which would be loyal to Moscow. The decision to create a national communist elite 
was prescribed by Lenin and approved by the 8th Communist Party Congress in 1919: 
The allocation of Party workers is wholly in the hands of the Party Central 
Committee. Its decisions are obligatory for all. The Central Committee guarantees the 
conducting of the most resolute struggle against all forms of localistic tendencies and 
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separatism 10 ese matters. 
The drive was launched to train Party cadres which were "national in form and 
socialist in content". 40 The Communist University of Workers of the East was 
established in Moscow to train reliable, cadres. Later this development was followed 
by the foundation in each republic of the notorious Party Schools ( Partshkola ), the 
purpose of which was to tum out elite of functionaries to execute all orders from 
41 Moscow. 
In the past the cooperation of native politicians with Moscow was essential for 
success, today the situation is not different. All the power positions in the national 
republics are still occupied by former Communists. The national Communist parties 
continue to rule in all the republics, albeit under different party names. To enhance 
their power position, the leadership in the republics has to be in a tacit alliance with 
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the Russian authorities. In its tum the existencence of national bureaucrats is 
necessary for the Russian authorities. The presence of national nomenclatura in the 
republics make it easier for the central authorities in Moscow to deal with any kind of 
opposition at the local level. As long as the present nomenclatura remains in power it 
will not be difficult for the Russian authorities to terminate any unwanted political 
movements in the ethnic republics. Nowadays the old power division system works 
even more effectively than before: all kinds of democratic and national progressive 
forces in the ethnic republics are suppressed by the hands of their own "national" 
nomenclatura, the loyal guards of the old regime and central authorities. Moscow, cut 
short any nationalistic agitation questioning its rule; at the same time it showed 
remarkable tolerance toward abuses of power by local native authorities. 
Separation of the Muslim community into quasi-nation states headed by 
subservient emissaries of the central power served Moscow's interests in the Soviet 
years, and seems to do the same in the post-Soviet period. Therefore, when analyzing 
current political parties and movements in the Muslim republics today, it is essential 
to give adequate attention to those who occupy power positions in the national 
republics, i.e. national nomenklatura through which the Center still successfully 
exercises its rule. 
The national leadership m the ethnic republics could not get rid of the 
traditional totalitarian mentality and centralized power structures, and continue to 
treat every political formation outside the government with exaggerated suspicion and 
hostility. The present governing apparatus in the national republics, is ill disposed to 
everything that develops independently from the government course, seriously 
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mpeding the activities ·of the opposition. Today it is much more difficult for the 
iational political movements to voice their aspirations due to severe discriminative 
neasures imposed by the national nomenclatura to satisfy the central authorities. If 
he dimension of the flagrant power abuses by the national political elite in the Central 
~sian republics alarms international human rights organizations, in the Muslim 
republics of the Russian Federation the situation is not much different. Thus the 
:amouflaged political terror and oppression of the national opposition in Tatarstan 
resulted in the consolidation of several political movements and parties of different 
ideologies under the Popular Patriotic Union of Tatarstan in a protest towards the 
current antidemocratic regime. 42 
Although modem Islamic revival does not challenge the state system, the 
present leadership consisting of old Communists is against everything that can 
constitute political opposition, with no exception for Islam. Despite the fact that Islam 
helps to rehabilitate the national cultures and national identity of the Muslims, the 
national nomenclatura in the Muslim republics have little interest in strengthening 
political Islam in their republics. 
Today without a proper understanding of the political structure of the Muslim 
republics, political culture, traditions and the mentality of their leadership, it will be 
difficult to comprehend the current political potential concentrated in these republics. 
Since the potential of political unity of the Muslims of Russia is the subject of 
this research, I fmd it necessary to illustrate the political situation inside each 
autonomous republic. Political unity can be realized under the certain conditions such 
as: uniformity of demands, similarity of goals, appropriate leadership based on unity 
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of mind, and desire to unite. Today, the myriad of local problems, that all the Muslim 
republics inherited from the Soviet past, hampers the unification of the Muslims. 
2.1.The Republic of Tatarstan. 
The Tatar Autonomous Republic has been artificially constructed in such a 
manner as to exclude a large proportion of the Tatar population. In this regard the 
Tatar Republic is unique among the Soviet Republics; in none of the others does the 
indigenous population represents so small a proportion of the total. At the time of its 
formation in 1920, the boundaries were drawn in such a way as to encompass 
only 1 459 600, or little more than a third of the approximately 4 200 000 Tatars then 
living in the Soviet Russia. 43 
The unfavorable position of the Tatars in Russia is explicable first by 
historical factors, and, second by distrust of the Tatars, who both before and after the 
revolution made constant attempts to gain independence for themselves and other 
Turkic peoples. To avoid such a threat the Soviet regime adopted a nationality policy 
in regard to the Tatars aimed at keeping them a minority in their own republic. After 
the elimination of Tatar national schools, standard Soviet schools were established 
and, thus, the compulsory teaching of Russian became the means for the upbringing of 
the new international man. (Never under the communist rule did the Tatar population 
in Tatarstan exceed 50% out of the total population in the republic).44 • 
Although the Tatars were one of the largest peoples of the Soviet Union, the 
Tatar republic was granted only an autonomous status. Stalin reported scornfully that 
the Tatars had as much chance of achieving Union republic status as of seeing their 
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own ears.45 The official Soviet explanation for the Tatar Republic's lack of Union 
status was that it does not border on the Soviet frontiers. Technically speaking it is 
so, but the main reason behind this inferior status was the right of secession; in case of 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, all the Union republics could automatically 
become independent states, whereas Autonomous republics did not have such a 
right.46 
In the complex federative system of the Soviet Union, the Tatar and Bashkir 
Autonomous Republics became the constituent republics of the Russian Socialist 
Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), which itself was one of the constituent republics, 
a Union republic of the Soviet Union. In a comparatively short period, between 1920 
and 1923, the government of the RSFSR established on its territory seventeen 
autonomous regions and republics.47 But in reality, the central government treated 
these autonomous republics only as a administrative districts, rather than autonomous 
ethnic entities. The government of the RSFSR retained in the conquered territories full 
control over military, economic, financial, and foreign affairs. 
The autonomous regions (sometimes called "Toilers' Communes") had no 
distinguishing juridical features even in terms of Soviet law and were described by one 
Soviet authority as "national gubemii". The autonomous republics,on the other hand, were 
regarded as endowed with a acertain degree of political competence, although what the limits 
of this competence were posed a question that troubled the best legal minds of the time. 48 
As was mentioned earlier, the attributes of the Soviet form of government in 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan were more or less similar to those in other autonomous 
republics: the farcical Supreme Soviet and Presidium with no real authority, the 
Council of Ministers, and all-powerful Republican Committee of the Communist 
Party. The only organ that hold real power was the Republican Committee of the 
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Communist Party. In all republics, oblasts, krays and rayons the whole state 
governmental structure was subordinated to the control of the Party apparatus, or to 
the Central Committee of each republic. The First Party Secretary of the Central 
Committee was a national, whereas the Second Secretary a Russian. Local non-
Russian communists, who did not know Russian, could not work in the Party 
apparatus. In consequence of their minority status within their own republics many 
Muslim peoples in the Russian Federation lacked full opportunity to play a leading 
part in the economic, administrative and cultural life of the republic and of the 
Federation. 
It is quite natural that during the seventy years of the Soviet regime nothing 
significant could happen in the political life and administrative structure of the 
autonomous republics of the Russian Federation. 
The ideological vacuum, which occurred after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, brought nations back to their historical roots. After the years of state-led 
oppression, the idea of national self-determination overwhelmed national republics. 
Immediately, as a natural phenomenon, at the end of the 1980-s numerous national 
front movements and political parties emerged in the ethnic republics, raising the 
concept of independence and the right of self-determination.Among the first republics 
proclaimed independence was Tatarstan. 
But change in the political status of the republic did not result in change of the 
administrative cadres of Tatarstan. As in almost all of the states, Soviet-era leaders 
have held onto power in Tatarstan. The Russian authorities quickly realized that the 
only way to keep Tatarstan under control was the preservation of the old communists 
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in power. The Yeltsin administration knew, that if a compliant regime existed in 
Tatarstan, then Russian authority would certainly prevail. The most powerful element 
of the Soviet society responsible for the preservation of the regime had been always 
the Party apparatus. Thus, the Moscow authorities gave Shaimiev absolute power, the 
right to perform the role of ideological gendarme, but under one condition - to 
eliminate the national opposition. Shlim.iev firmly guaranteed Moscow that he ''will 
never allow the extremist forces to seize power in Tatarstan".49 These "extremist 
forces" in Tatarstan were advocating not only independence of Tatarstan, but also the 
unity of Turco-Muslim subjects of the Russian Federation.Today in the Muslim 
republics the initiatives concerning unity along the Turkic or religious lines come 
from the opposition parties, the official governments avoid dealing with the issues 
that may create an aggresive counteraction from Moscow. 
For the Russian authorities it was vitally important that Tatarstan forget its 
aspirations for independence, while for the local communists it was essential to stay 
in power at any cost. Thus, two fundamental threats - the possibility of secession, and 
national-patriotic movements would be eliminated simply by one maneuver, by 
retaining the old apparatus in power. For the sake of his power position, Shaimiev 
quickly forgot that it was the Tatar nationalists who saved him from the hands of the 
Russian court for his support of the coup d'etat in 1991. 
Consequently after 1993 the government of Tatarstan openly began to 
deviate from the sovereignty line. The sovereign course of Tatarstan ended with the 
Bilateral Treaty on Mutual Delegation of Authorities signed in February 1994. The 
Treaty opened a new stage in the development of Russian federalism. 
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The bilateral power-sharing treaty between Moscow and Tatarstan is merely a 
broad statement of principles. The key power-sharing arrangements were detailed in 
12 cooperation agreements where the autonomous rights of the republic are severely 
restricted.The bilateral treaty makes up 60-70 per cent of the Federal Treaty's text. 
Althogh federal authorities claimed that they had granted broad powers to the 
"sovereign republics within the Russian Federation", in reality nothing changed in the 
economic and political status of the republics. The ownership of land and natural 
resources were put under the joint jurisdiction of the local and federal governments. 
The Treaty recognizes the authority of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.50 
When signing the bilateral treaty that marked the legal end of the sovereignty of his 
republic, the Tatarstan president Shaimiev proudly concluded: "Strong Republics, 
strong center."51 However Tatarstan did not become stronger. After the signing of 
agreement, it turned out to be no more than an administrative sub-division of the 
Russian Federation with administrative organs whose functions are essentially 
identical to those in any of the other territories. 
For Moscow signing the power-sharing treaty with Tatarstan was very 
important, to serve as a model to regulate relations with other republics, specially 
with Chechnya. Later, a series of treaties on the same basis was concluded with other 
resource-rich republics such as Bashkortostan, Sakha, Kabartay-Balkar, North 
Ossetia, Buryatiya and Udmurtiya. Along with "sovereign" state Tatarstan, 
Yekaterinburg, Kaliningrad, Krasnodar, Komi-Permyak and many other of Russia's 
regions concluded bilateral treaties with Moscow.52 Only the republic of Chechnya 
was an exception to the bilateral treaty club. 
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Although only a few of these treaties were published and nobody knows the 
exact details behind the numerous cooperation agreements enclosed in the treaties, 
according to the federalists such treaties minimize the secession potential of the ethnic 
republics.Yeltsin was absolutely right when he said that bilateral treaties "strengthen 
Russian statehood". s3 As the bilateral treaties advanced, the federal government 
altered the terminology in the documents to limit recognition of statehood.Concern of 
the central authorities about "legal separatism" in the regions is already expressed in a 
law declaring the Russian constitution and federal legislation to be supreme 
throughout Russian Federation territory. The law, recently adopted by the state Duma 
on 25 April 1997, in its nature rejects the bilateral power-sharing agreements signed 
between the federal government and 26 regions. s4 
Since that time the relationship between the national political elite and their 
Russian patrons remained stable and balanced. One month after the signing of the 
treaty, Tatarstan president Shaimiev and Tatarstan Supreme Soviet Chairman Farid 
Muhamet~in became deputies to the federal council of the Russian parliament. ss To 
assure his loyalty to Russia, the president of the Tatarstan Republic M.Shaimiev 
became one of the lea.ding members and most active supporters of the Russian prime 
minister Victor Chemomyrdin's movement "Our Home is Russia".s6 
In Tatarstan, Shaimiev was treated as a traitor; as a Shah Gali by the Tatar 
national movement, s7 but Moscow seemed to be very satisfied. If in the past the 
Yeltsin administration perceived Tatarstan as a serious threat to the Russian territorial 
integrity and "bad example" for other autonomous republics, now Tatarstan became 
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an exemplary model for the regulating federal relations. Thus, instead of Tatar 
statehood, the Tatar people get a "Tatar model of statehood." 
Now the political course of sovereign Tatarstan develops in the shadow of the 
political course chosen by the Russian government. The political and economic 
situation in Russia has considerable influence on Tatarstan, specially its economy. 
As soon as the Federal authorities secured the position of Tatarstan within the 
Russian borders, they launched a campaign against the Tatar national-patriotic 
movements.This was done, as many times in the history, by the hands of the Tatar 
nomenclatura. The scenario was simple: counter-rallies organized by the local 
nomenc/atura to hinder the ''unconstitutional behavior" of the opposition. This 
scenario was effective in all ethnic republics, except Chechnya. 
The reorganization of power echelons was immediately accomplished in the 
republic.By manipulating election rules, Shaimiev expelled members of the 
opposition from the highest legislative and executive organs. All the heads of local 
administrations, were subordinated directly to the President himself. 
To counteract to the All-Tatar People Kurultay and Milli Mee/is, the puppet 
International Congress of Tatars and its Executive Committee was created from the 
state budget. Legal proceedings were initiated against the Milli Mee/is, the lttifaq 
party, and individual leaders of the national movement.· The political parties that 
supported independence were refused in registration in the regions, under the pretext 
that their actions endangered stability in the republic. The culmination of all this was 
the arbitrary decision of the court to expel Ittifaq from its building. 58 
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To show that th~ demands for sovereignty come not from the legislative 
organs but from the group of peoples on the street meetings, the authorities spent all 
efforts to keep the nationalist and democratic parties out of the Parliament. During 
the last parliamentary elections in Tatarstan, which were held in 1995, the whole state 
apparatus was mobilized to prevent "extreme" forces from winning the seats in the 
Parliament. 
Until 1995, the highest executive and administrative organ of Tatarstan was 
the Gossovet (State Council). In the past it possessed real authority, but today its 
nominal powers are severely restricted. After the general elections in 1995, the Tatar 
parliament was immediately re-structured, and the old-guard bureaucrats and the 
heads of administration took the parliamentary seats of democrat and national-
patriots. Many laws adopted by the old Parliament were altered or canceled, and new 
laws giving absolute authority and limitless power to the President were adopted. 
Even the Constitution endured numerous amendments; many articles were eradicated 
and replaced by new ones. Thus, in the old Constitution the term of presidency was 
limited: the president could not be reelected more than two times, and the age of the 
president could not exceed 65. The newly elected parliament, by an order of the 
president Shaimiev, abolished this article and adopted a new concept of unlimited 
life-long presidency.59 Although the Tatar language is proclaimed as a state language, 
meetings in the Parliament are held in Russian. 
The official government of the sovereign Tatar Republic is a typical example 
of the government of an autonomous republic of the Russian Federation. It works 
under close supervision by the President and does not enjoy much power in practice. 
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In the past the government, Cabinet of Ministers and Ministers had to be ratified 
through the Parliament, now all the members of the executive apparatus are appointed 
personally by the President himself, without any ratification by the Parliament. 
During the presidential elections on 1996, president Shaimiev was re-elected. 
He was the sole candidate on the ballot. The Russian constitution prohibits candidates 
from running unopposed, but the amended Tatar constitution does not.60 
Due his political compliance and pliability the present president of Tatarstan 
has never enjoyed much confidence in the eyes of the national intelligentsia. Today 
the purely selfish interests of the leading political elite, clash with the patriotism and 
nationalism of the local opposition parties. Such division in political leadership in the 
national republics created two completely separate groups of as state leaders and 
national leaders. The only exception was the ethnic region where the republican leader 
was himself also the leader of the nationalist organization - Chechnya. 
For a better understanding of the political situation in Tatarstan, it is 
necessary to know that today the Tatar people and the people of Tatarstan are two 
different things. The Soviet autonomous republics were designed with the purpose to 
create mixed, polytechnic republics. The republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are 
the best example of this ethno-adrninistarive experiment. Today neither Tatarstan nor 
Bashkortostan may claim that their republics belong to the Tatar or Bashkir nations. 
Both republics have considerable amount of Russian population, which is also an 
inalienable part of the people of Tatarstan or Bashkortostan. There are the peoples, or 
simply the citizens of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Today the statehood of Tatarstan 
is based on the principle of territorial (geographic), not ethnic sovereignty. The 
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Tatarstan state is described by the Tatar president Shaimiev as "a democratic state 
expressmg will and interests of the whole multinational people of the republic".61 
Therefore, the government of Tatarstan using the slogan: "Tatarstan is for the 
Tatarstanis" (Tatarstan dlya Tatarstantsev), conducts a balanced policy towards the 
abstract Tatarstani people, "expressing the will and the interests of the whole 
multinational people of Tatarstan".62 The interests of the Tatar people are represented 
by the government only as much as the interests of the Russians and other 
nationalities. 
Those who are interested in the political and historical development of the 
Tatar nation alone, must not associate the development of the Tatar nation within the 
context of the political course of the government of Tatarstan, because the 
government of Tatarstan represents the interests of all the peoples, citizens of 
Tatarstan, not the Tatar nation. It was due to the political traditions of the Tatar 
intelligentsia and high political culture of the Tatar people, that the Tatar nation has 
once again openly demonstrated its willingness to survive as a distinct nation. 
2.2.The Republic of Bashkortostan. 
The autonomous Bashkir Republic was established on March 23, 1919 on the 
basis of a vernacular with no written form. Up to creation of the two separate Tatar 
and Bashkir republics, Tatar was a common language for these two Muslim and 
Turkic peoples. It is difficult to find other peoples in Russia and the former Soviet 
Union so close and akin to each other as Tatars and Bashkirs. Being an enclave, 
Bashkortostan, like Tatarstan was isolated from the rest of Islamic world. Despite the 
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commonality of history, culture and language, today the Bashkirs do not support the 
idea of unification or confederation with Tatarstan. Before the Revolution there was 
no antagonism between the Tatar and Bashkir peoples, but nowadays Tatarstan's 
relations with Bashkortostan are far from satisfactory. 
A new republic of Bashkortostan was constructed in such a manner as to have 
a large number of Tatars within its borders reduced the Bashkirs to a minority status 
within their own republic. In 1922 the districts ofBelebeev, Birsk, and Ufa, where the 
Tatars represented the majority of the population, were excluded from Tatar Republic 
and joined to Bashkortostan. As a result of artificial division, the Bashkirs constitute 
only 21.9. percent out of total population in Bashkortostan, after the Russians, who 
are 39.3, and Tatars who are 28.4 percent.63 
Bashkortostan and Tatarstan have followed very different national policies. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bashkir leadership adopted pro-Russian 
policies which do not emphasize political sovereignty. Bashkortostan from the 
beginning signed the Federal Treaty and became an eager proponent of the policy of 
integration with Russia. While Tatarstan boycotted the referendum in 1993, 
Bashkortostan actively participated in it, giving full support to Yeltsin and his 
policies. 
Later, when Tatarstan was forced to sign a bilateral treaty on the mutual 
delegation of authorities, Bashkortostan authorities scornfully noticed that ''unlike 
Tatarstan they have a firm course, and they never changed their position 180 degree as 
Tatarstan does".64 Politicized ethnicity among the Bashkirs was not as strong and 
popular as among the Tatars. Therefore, from the beginning, the Bashkir President 
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Murtaza Rahimov stressed the economic sovereignty of the republic. The government 
of Bashkortostan has always concentrated on economic problems, disregarding 
serious political problems inside the republic. Such intensive claims of economic 
autonomy are based on dreams of a petroleum paradise. The Bashkir authorities 
believe that by gaining full control over the country's oil reserves, the republic will 
secure its economic prosperity and welfare. But it can not be said that Bashkortostan 
has made considerable headway in gaining economic independence. The export of oil, 
petrochemical goods and products of the military-industrial complex are still under 
the strict control of the Russian authorities. All hopes about economic self-rule 
disappeared when Bashkortostan was forced to sign the economic supplementary to 
the federal treaty.65 In other words, like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan has as much 
independence as the bilateral treaty permits it to have. 
Another reason for the concentration on economic issues is the existence of 
serious political problems. By giving priority to economic issues, the Bashkir 
leadership has removed the national problem from the agenda of the republic. 
Bashkortostan is a typical example of a polyethnic state, but the leadership 
generally ignores the ethno-national structure of the republic. Although the Bashkirs 
constitute only 21.9 per cent of the total population in the republic - stay on the third 
place after the Russians and Tatars - the present Bashkir government treats the 
republic as a national state with one central ethnos - the Bashkirs. 66 It is doubtful 
whether the Soviets have succeeded in providing the Bashkirs with a specific national 
;ulture and a Bashkir historical tradition. Therefore, the Bashkirs are extremely 
:onscious of Tatar domination. 
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Since 1994 the Bashkir government have been working a project called "The 
Ethnoses of Bashkortostan". In this project the Bashkir authorities attempt to resolve 
national problem of Bashkortostan by giving equal status to all major nationalities of 
the republics.67 However, national equality has not been achieved , and the Tatars, the 
second largest nationality of the Bashkir republic, still suffer national discrimination. 
In addition to its ethnic problems, Bashkortostan suffers from serious 
ecological problems. During the Soviet years the Bashkir population suffered several 
times medically and genetically the consequences of repeated atomic explosions in the 
region. In the 1990's the citizens of Ufa underwent mass-poisoning caused by the 
leakage of phenol to the city water system. 68 
The political leadership of the Bashkir republic is in its nature and 
composition similar to that of Tatarstan. There is Baskir-dominated parliament 
composed of the ex-communists. On 12 January 1992 Murtaza Rahimov, a former 
refinery director and chairman of the Supreme Soviet, was elected president. 69 
Unlike his counterpart in Tatarstan, president Rahimov adopted a liberal 
policy towards the Bashkir national opposition parties. It can be even said that there is 
substantial solidarity on some matters between the Bashkir government and 
opposition parties.70 The Bashkir authorities jealously guard the existence of a distinct 
Bashkir nation, because without the presence of the Bashkir nation, there would be 
no Bashkir republic. For the authorities, the preservation of the Bashkir nation is a 
matter of dignity, otherwise they would obliged to recognize that Bashkirs as well as 
"their" lands as a historical part of the Tatar nation. 
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2.3.The North Caucasus 
Like the Muslims of the Volga-Ural region the Caucasian peoples were 
interested in the formation of independent republic. In May 1917 the First North 
Caucasian Congress set up the Central Committee of the Union of the North Caucasus 
and Dagestan. Full authority in the regions was assumed by the Central Committee of 
the Union of the Mountain People and exercised through local Chechen, lngush, 
Balkar and other councils.71 At the Third North Caucasian Congress which was held 
on September 1917, it was decided that the future of the North Caucasus could only 
be assured by separation from Russia and proclamation of national independence.On 
May 1918 the independent North Caucasian Republic was proclaimed. During the 
brief period of the United Mountain Republic, the Caucasian peoples were ruled by a 
single unified government for the first time. 
During the period of the establishment of the Soviet regime the North 
Caucasus became a ferocious battle field among major forces: the Bolsheviks, the 
Caucasian nationalists, the White Army of Denikin together with Cossaks and the 
Muslim religious groupings. 72 
General Denikin leading the Volunteer Army in South Russia was fighting for 
a united, undivided Russia and was strongly hostile to anti-Russian nationalist 
movements. Bitter fighting took place between Denikin's army and the local 
nationalists and civilian population. 
In the light of these developments, the Muslim sheihs and Socialist 
intelligentsia made crucial tactical mistake by joining the Bolsheviks in a struggle for 
the liberation of their homelands. The Red Army was greeted as an ally by the local 
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peoples who had been engaged in war for their freedom.Once again the national 
intelligentsia of the Caucasus was attracted by the national program of the 
Bolsheviks, which promised the right of all nations of the former Russian Empire to 
"self-determination, including secession".In his famous speech addressed to the North 
Caucasian peoples and concerned autonomy, Stalin stated: 
The whole purpose of autonomy is to involve the mountain people in the governing 
of their country .. .lt is essential that your people are drawn into all spheres of administration 
of the country.The sort of autonomy we are talking here is that under which your people, 
knowing your language, your way of life, are present in all administrative organs.73 
At first in place of a single North Caucasus Republic, two republics were 
created: On January 1919 the Mountain (Gorskaya) ASSR (which embraced six 
peoples), and in November of the same year the Dagestan ASSR. 74 
The Mountain Republic comprised Chechnia, lngushetia, Ossetia, Kabarda, 
Balkaria and Karachay. The creation of the Mountain Republic was met with great 
enthusiasm and optimism of all the nations represented within it. The Declaration of 
the Constituent Assembly of the Soviets of the Mountain Republic adopted on 22 
April 1921, stated that "all the peoples of the Mountain ASSR are independent and 
free to decide the means of development and creation of national culture. "75 The 
Shariat and the adat were officially acknowledged as the basic constitutional laws of 
the Mountain Republic.76 Although Stalin himself stated that "the Soviet Government 
considers the shariat to be as rightful and customary a law as any in force among 
other people of the USSR"77, this was a very unusual attitude for the Soviet system of 
government. 
In order to break up the unity of the Caucasian peoples, the Soviets granted 
pseudo-autonomies to almost every Caucasian nationality.Gradually autonomous 
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regions were created out of the sub-divided Soviet Mountain Republic. Karachay-
Cherkess (12 January 1922), K.abartay-Balkar ( 16 January 1922 ), Adygey ( 27 July 
1922 ), Chechen (20 November 1922).78 
By the Decree of 7 July 1924, the remnants of the Soviet Mountain republic 
were finally disbanded and in its place two autonomous regions, North Ossetia and 
Ingushetia came into being. 79 All these autonomous republics together with Dagestan, 
became a part of the RSFSR, and were subordinated directly to the central 
government of the RSFSR. 
The political and administrative reordering made by the Soviet authorities did 
not fulfill the expectations of the North Caucasian communists. The nationality 
question in the multinational Caucasus was resolved "at one stroke" without taking 
into consideration historical past and tribal interests of the peoples living here. The 
Soviets forcibly resettled different ethnic groups distorting the ethnic balance in 
many regions. The demarcations of the frontiers in the North Caucasus were made 
without adequate attention to the ethnic and linguistic peculiarities. To keep this 
turbulent region weak the notorious divide and rule strategy was applied on large 
scale. This policy put disparate peoples together and divided closely related tribes. 
Thus, the Kabartay-Balkar Republic was designed to incorporate two 
unrelated nationalities: the Kabardinians, the indigenous mountain people and make 
up 48 per cent of the population, and the Turkic speaking Balkars, who make up 9 per 
cent. 80 These peoples are very distinct from each other in cultural and historical terms. 
Karachay and Balkars, two peoples having virtually the same language and traditions, 
were separated without any pretext. 
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The situation was similar in the Karachay-Cherkes republic, where the 
Turkic-speaking Karachay (a kindred people to the Balkars) and the Cherkes (a 
kinfolk of the Kabartay people), were forcibly brought together into one the republic. 
·, 
As everywhere else, the Bolsheviks socialized the North Caucasus lands by 
dubious and crude methods, depriving the local communities almost of everything. 
Together with the Chechens and lngushs, Karachays, Balkars, Kalmyks, Crimean 
Tatars and Germans were deported. The Decree of the Council of Ministers of the 
USSR of 24 November 1948 states: ''The resettlement of the Chechens, lngushs, 
Karachais, Balkars, Kalmyks, Germans, Crimean Tatars and others to the different 
regions of the Soviet Union, has been done ones and for all, without any right to 
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return to the former places of settlement. 
The outcome of all these developments is that the North Caucasus turned to be 
a potential arena for conflict. Today every republic of the North Caucasus has its own 
range of problems that could burst out into violent conflict. One such region is 
Dagestan. Dagestan, a heavily Muslim region, has a strategically important position in 
the North Caucasus on the shores of the Caspian Sea. Taking into account a high level 
of religiosity and conservatism of the local peoples, the Bolsheviks applied a more 
cautious policy to Dagestan. In his speech at the Congress of the Peoples of Dagestan 
on November 13, 1920, in Temirkhanshura (Buynaksk), Stalin declared that 
"Dagestan must be governed in accordance with its national peculiarities and 
customs."82 Actually, there was a certain degree of truth in Stalin's words. Dagestan 
has been always ruled according to its own unwritten, unseen customary law of adat. 
The Dagestanis treated communism with a healthy skepticism, viewing it as a 
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continuation of Tsarist expansionism, and adapting it to the needs of the republic as 
before. Without these "concessions" this conservative, but at the same time, 
explosive and incendiary region would hardly adapt to Communist rule. The leader of 
the Kumyk national movement Tenglik said: "In our society from the communist 
times the upper hand to decide, judge and combine administrative functions with the 
traditions of the cemaat, always belonged to the administrative authorities". 83 
The internal situation of Dagestan , is more complicated than that of any other 
republics. Today there are more than thirty different nationalities living in Dagestan, 
but the Dagestanis are not consolidated into one nation. The communist authorities of 
Daghestan simply mixed all the population of the republic, but no one people in 
Dagestan has officially defined political status. Therefore, the "nationality question" 
potentially is more explosive in Dagestan. 
As everywhere else, the administrative system of this region was designed 
according to the crude territorial principle. Dagestan has a unique natural landscape: 
from one side the mountains of the Caucasus, from another side the valleys of the 
Caspian lowlands. The Republic of Dagestan was created on the place of the old 
Dagestan oblast, without taking into account interests of many peoples living on this 
territory. In 1922 year, it was decided to resettle indigenous Mountain peoples to the 
valeys. The process of the forced resettlement of the Mountaineers to the plains 
continued up to 1990. This forced resettlement of some peoples of Dagestan created 
the so-called prikutanniye zemli, appropriated lands, as land in the plains was 
distributed to the highlanders. The migration from the highlands of A var and Dargin 
farmers provided numerical predominance of the outside settlers over the native 
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population of the valleys, As a result the percentage of the indigenous people of the 
valley dramatically decreased. Thus the Kumyk people, once the only native dwellers 
of the lowlands, consisting 60% in 1926, today became aminority of 23.9% on their 
own territory. ·84 Another typical fact for Dagestan is a phenomenon of divided 
nation, like Lezgins, Avars and Nogays. The state frontier between Russia and 
Azerbaijan on the river Samur has placed half a million Dagestani Lezgins and A vars 
on the Azeri side. After the collapse of the Soviet Union these peoples find 
themselves on the different sides of national borders. Thus a part of the Lezgins now 
live in Dagestan, while another part live in Azerbaijan. The Lezgins of Dagestan 
founded a Sadval movement to press for border changes that would allow them to 
unite with the Lezgins of Azerbaijan. Today a border dispute is strained. Azeri 
officials has accused the Lezgin national movement Sadval of causing explosions in 
the Balru metro and 120 leaders of Lezgin and A var national organizations have been 
banned from Azerbaijan. 85 
For the time being, compared to other regions, Dagestan has remained a 
relatively loyal comer of Russia. But this does not mean that Dagestan is an 
exemplary Muslim republic. Economically, Dagestan is one of the poorest republics 
of the Russian Federation. The life expectancy here is lower than in other regions of 
the Caucasus. 86 Politically it is the most heterogeneous republic, exhausted by 
numerous internal problems among various cliques, clans, and tribal organizations. 
According to many observers Dagestan is a comparative oasis of ethnic 
stability. But in reality, with hundreds of peoples, nations, tribes, cliques and clans, 
today's Dagestan resembles a Pandora's box. The ethnic communities in Dagestan 
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jealously keep an eye on. each other, and the nationality of any public appointee is 
always noted. The system of ethnic quotas permeated all spheres of life. Feudal ways, 
social contrast, hidden dictatorship and discrimination among the different 
nationalities are evident. Everything is decided and ordered "sverhu ", or from the 
top. According to Magomedhan Magomethanov, a senior researcher in the Dagestan 
Institute of History, "The Local Dagestani leadership is making the socio-political 
situation worse.It includes many people who are the products of the communist 
regime, who beyond Moscow's control turned their positions into a gravy train. It is 
openly said that posts are bought and many are filled by unknown bandits. Young 
people, without the means to support themselves, are turning to crime and joining 
armed gangs that operate inside the republic and in other parts ofRussia".87 
It is true that the peoples of Dagestan have been exhausted by the seventy-
years obligatory friendship and false :fraternity. Practically, the nationality question of 
Dagestan is obviously difficult to resolve. One of the leaders of the Kumyk popular 
front Tenglik stated "Today the nationality policy of the Dagestan must have 
multilateral character, taking into account the fact that there are nations willing to 
develop according to self-determination principles an in their own way, but not as a 
part of the hypothetical, one and indivisible Dagestani people. "88 
This forcible unification of the peoples into a single republic did not, however 
eliminate the urge to gain autonomy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union almost 
every individual nationality in Dagestan has formed popular front movements and 
separate organizations to defend their rights and put an end to the double standard 
treatment within their own republic. The Kumyk national movement Tenglik put 
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forward the principle of tlie federalization of the Dagestan by creation of autonomous 
national-territorial units.89 Together with the Kumyks many other nationalities of 
Dagestan demand federative restructuring of the republic where every ethnos would 
have its own territorial autonomy.90 Some of the Lezgin leaders work on the project 
of national-cultural autonomy of the Lezgin people both in Azerbaijan and 
Dagestan.91 It seems that in the future in Dagestan two peoples: on the South the 
Lezgins and on the North the Kumyks, will play an important role. 
Despite the corruption, political nihilism, and stagnation in the society, the 
role of Islam in Dagestan is much stronger than in many of the other Muslim 
republics of Russia. The strong right-wing clerical organizations, such as the 
Naqshbandi Brotherhood of Uzun Hadji still have a strong influence on the course of 
. D gh 92 events m a estan. 
Like Dagestan, the Kabartay-Balkar republic contains all the elements of the 
ethnic conflict. Just recently on November 1996, the Balkar people made a desperate 
attempt to free itself from the dominating rule of the Kabardinians. In November 1996 
the National Council of the Balkar People held a Congress where the independence 
of the Balkar people and secession from the Kabartay-Balkar Republic was 
proclaimed. Under the chairmanship of the general Bekbov, the Congress leaders, in 
order to escape from the dictatorship of the Kabartay president Kokov, appealed to 
Yeltsin to submit the new republic to the Russian presidential rule. The Russian 
authorities refused to recognize this self-proclaimed republic, and soon after all the 
members of the Balkar National Council and participants of the Congress were 
arrested. The Balkar National Council was prohibited by law. Later General Bekbov 
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was forced to recant and make a public statement of rejection of all the decisions of 
the Congress. Once again, Kabartay President Kokov was left with absolute power 
and authority.93 Nevertheless, a sense of unease and discontent within the republic 
remains, which could soon manifest itself again. 
There is also scope for conflict in the Karachay-Cherkes Republic. In the 
Karachay-Cherkes Republic the Russians constitute 42.5 per cent. Kararchay 31 per 
cent and Cherkes only 9.6 per cent.94 Like many other nationalities in the Caucasus, 
these three nationalities were brought together against their will. As a natural 
phenomenon, the Karachai began to ask for a division of the autonomous republic on 
an administrative basis. The Cherkess reacted to the Karachai demands by forming 
their own movement, which opposed Karachai demands for separation. Frightened by 
the rise of the nationalistic sentiments, the Cossaks also began to organize. 95 The 
partocrat establishment in the republic resisted all these manifestations, and for now 
open conflict has been avoided. 
The Ingush-Osset clash is one of the conflicts, that has deteriorated into a 
war.After the deportation in of the In.gush 1944, the Prigorodniy district of the 
Chechen-In.gush republics was annexed to the North Osset ASSR.When the In.gush 
were allowed to return, they found their homes and lands in the Prigorodniy district 
occupied by the Ossets. The North Ossetian authorities refused, however, to return the 
district under the jurisdiction of the Chechen-Ingush republic. 96 After the 
proclamation of the autonomous lngush republic, centered on the Prigorodniy district 
the conflict became more fierce. The lngush intensified their activities, and in 1992 
this conflict resulted in a full-scale war with the involvement of troops from Russia, 
52 
North Ossetia, and the lngush republic. Chechen volunteers were also involved in the 
conflict on the side of the lngush. 97 
One thing can be said in summation of the current situation in the Caucasus: 
at the moment almost all of the Cauca8us nations are too busy with their own 
administrative, economic and political problems to work on supranational issues. 
Today the Caucasus peoples live dispersed in their national republics, in most cases 
assotiating themselves with citizenship of their republic, rather than with the 
supranational notion of being Caucasian Mountaineers ( Gortsy ). 
After the general euphoria of 1990's, by the end of 1994, in many republics 
the characteristics of the totalitarian old regime began to reemerge, and national 
republics fell under the authority of reactionary governments. In many Caucasus 
republics, with exception of the Chechnya and lngush republics, the moderate, 
conservative regimes reinforced their positions. The common features of these 
regimes are a conservative outlook, oligarchic politics and status quo policies. Instead 
of promoting pan-Caucasian unity, so necessary for this turbulent region, the official 
leadership persistently abstain from any kind of cooperation that can endanger their 
power positions. 
Under these circumstances, unity is vitally necessary for the Caucasus and 
other Muslim regions of the Russian Federation. Despite the common tragedies and 
shared historical and political destiny, for the time being no strong united movement 
and democratic political parties have emerged. There are expressions of empathy and 
compassion towards Chechnya but, unfortunately, there is no real unity among the 
North Caucasian peoples, which are driven by nationalist conflicts and local political 
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rivalries. There are many local-scale popular front movements being established to 
defend the ethno-cultural values of certain nations, but none of the Caucasus peoples, 
except for Checbnia and Abkhazia, have expressed any desire for full political 
independence. 
Despite these post-Soviet realities in the North Caucasus, and other Muslim 
republics, there is one reality that seems to be unchanged. The North Caucasus was 
defeated but undaunted. This fact came to the surface with Chechnya's proclamation 
of independence. Since the republic Ichkeriya is an independent state, the detailed 
account about the political situation in this republic is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Today the Chechen republic is adapting to the new post-wai reality. Whatever 
the outcome of the present crisis, independence is certainly the ultimate dream of the 
Chechens. The ultimate secession of the Chechenya would encourage other republics 
to opt for independence. Chechen war ended, opening a new, unknown phase in the 
Russo-Muslim relations. 
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3.1.Islamic Renaissance in the Muslim Republics of Russia. 
Today after the long period of isolation, Islam in Russia is experiencing a 
significant revival. After years of state-led repression, it is now acceptable for the 
Muslims to publicly display their religiosity. The trend of opening mosques, Koran-
reading courses, training Islamic clergy increased throughout Russia. A creative 
interaction has developed between the Muslim republics of Russia and the Islamic 
world. 
The rise of religious consciousness and nationalist sentiments paved the way 
towards to the creation of the numerous organizations along the religious lines. The 
political dynamics of Muslim life within the multinational Russian state, after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, showed the political and religious maturity of the 
Muslims of Russia. Unlike their co-religionists in other parts of the former Soviet 
Union, the Muslims of Russia represent a highly politicized and economically 
developed community. Gaining a historical opportunity to voice their aspirations 
openly, the Muslim nations of Russia became the active participants in the country 
politics, forming numerous nation- and religion-based political associations and 
movements. In many places the process of regaining national identity was 
accompanied by the traditional ideas of statehood. The course of and national and 
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cultural revival of the Muslim peoples of Russia varied in forms and methods of its 
manifestation, but there was one thing in common; in all the Muslim regions the 
process of political revival was accompanied by the intensive religious rebirth. 
A religious revival is a complex social phenomenon that can be studied from 
various angles. On one hand it is return to the traditional Muslim values through the 
practicing Islam, as an every-day fact, on the other hand it is rise of political Islam. 
Both aspects of the revival of Islam are present today in the Muslim republics of the 
Russian Federation. 
3.1. The Tatarstan Republic 
The territory of the Volga-Ural has been an Islamic bastion since the ninth 
century. With the centuries-long traditions of belonging to the Islamic civilization 
the Kazan Tatars are the most influential Muslim nation in Russia. As practicing 
Muslims the Tatars conform to the Sunni Hanafi school. 
Islam and spiritual life of the Tatar nation are closely related with each other. 
For the Tatars preservation of national identity, culture and language against the 
Russification was an important issue. It was due to Islam that the Tatar nation, despite 
being subjected to the numerous russification attempts was preserved as a single 
united nation. 
During the Soviet period Islam has been completely eliminated from the 
public life: mosques, medreses and other religious establishments had disappeared 
dramatically. Due to the absence of religious education the number of Tatars who 
said they were believers decreased during the Soviet period. However, after the 
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collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of Tatars who consider themselves believers 
increased substantially. In a social survey made in 1980 year in Tatarstan, only 43.5 
per cent of the respondents considered themselves to be believers confessing Islam. 
Ten years later in 1990-91 years this percentage increased to 67 per cent. In a recent 
survey made by Moscow, 90 percent of the Tatars living in Tatarstan considered 
themselves Muslim believers.98 Many Tatars who do not consider themselves 
believers still participate in religious customs and holidays.More than 80 per cent of 
the young Tatar couples have religious wedding ceremonies. 99 
The start of the organized activities of the Muslims ofTatarstan dates to 1989, 
when the 11 OOth Hijri anniversacy of adoption of Islam by the Bulgar Kingdom was 
celebrated. Thousands of Muslims participated in this religious anniversazy. For the 
first time, official delegations from Turkey, Arab and other Muslim countries came to 
Russia to celebrate this significant event. For this reason, the famous Azim mosque 
which did not serve as a mosque for seventy years, was returned to the Muslims. 
In the light of these developments, in 1992 the independent Spiritual Board of 
Tatarstan (Tatarstan Diniye Nazareti) was created. On 21 August 1992 in Ufa, there 
was a congress of the Muslim clergy, which announced the creation of the 
independent Spiritual Board of Bashkortostan.On the next day, in Tatarstan, in the 
city of Naberezhniye Chelny (Yar <;alb), the congress of the Muslim clergy of the 
Republic of Tatarstan proclaimed the creation of the Spiritual Board of the Republic 
ofTatarstan.100 Today this Spiritual Board acts independently; training its own cadres, 
printing religious literature and organizing pilgrimage to the holy places. 
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Existence of a separate religious administration accelerated the process of 
religious revival in Tatarstan.Today there are more than 500 mosques and nearly 700 
religious committees, (mahalle) registered under the Committee on Religious Affairs 
of Tatarstan. Apart from large number of medreses, the first religious university 
Muhammadiya was opened in Kazan. At the same time there are two distinguished 
medreses Tenzile and Yuldiz working in the city ofNaberejniye Chelny. However, in 
the building of the famous historical Kul SarifMosque, symbol of the Kazan Khanate, 
there is a church today.101 
On 29 November 1990 Iman Islamic Center was established.With its own 
publishing house, numerous printed works and four periodical journals: Iman 
(1991),Vera (in Russian,1994), Iman Nuri (1993), Ya/an (1994), the Iman Center has 
became one of the most industrious and effective religious organizations.102 From 
1991 up to today the religious printing house of Iman (chief editor Venerulla 
Y arullin) has made significant headway in publication of religious books and 
pamphlets on Tatar and Russian languages. Beyond this, there are several religious 
periodicals published in Russian and Tatar: the journals Din ve Magiy~et and Islam 
Nuri, and the newspapers Iman, Islam Monberi among others. Many medreses also 
have their own printing houses. 
In order to to progress the present religious establishments needs concrete 
state assistance. Unfortunately, today the religious societies contend with all of their 
problems unaided. The lack of the qualified, competent teachers and the low level of 
the clergy trained during the Soviet era is retarding the speed of Islamic revival. The 
shortage of clergy knowing Arabic results in a totally inadequate number of Muslim 
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educational establishmenµ;. Some of the medreses in Tatarstan lack elementary 
conditions to conduct education process. The central and local authorities close their 
eyes to these problems, justifying it by the fact that religion is constitutionally 
separated from the state. 
On 21 June 1996, in Kazan the first political religious party "Muslims of 
Tatarstan" was established under the chairmanship of the Tatarstan's Mufti Abdulla 
Galiullin. On 1 7 July 1996 this party was officially registered under the Ministry of 
Justice of Tatarstan. 103 The main objectives of the movement are concentrated upon 
such issues'· as; national revival and development of all the Muslim peoples and 
national minorities; preservation of their national languages, culture and traditions; 
defending the rights and interests of the Muslim people and other national minorities 
of the republic Tatarstan; strengthening traditional historical ties and collaboration 
between Muslims and Christians; making contribution to the adaptation of the proper 
national policy, answering the interests of the Muslim peoples together with other 
peoples of the Republic of Tatarstan."104 
In the article concerning functions and activities of the party, it is stated: "For 
the accomplishment of the objective mentioned above the movement will: protect 
political, spiritual, economic and social interests of the Muslims of Tatarstan; unify 
the Muslims of Tatarstan for the sake of the civil agreement and national accord, 
material and moral prosperity of the society; seek proportional representation of the 
Muslims in the power structures at federal, republican and regional levels, in the 
organs of local administration and all spheres of social and political life; provide 
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assistance in the building new mosques, opening religious schools, train Muslim 
clergy, promote the spiritual development and religious enlightenment ofMuslims.1°5 
The "Muslims of Tatarstan" party is the first registered political organization 
on religious lines in Tatarstan. The "Muslilns of Tatarstan" party is not a branch of the 
all-Russian movement ''Union of Muslims of Russia", it is a completely independent 
political movement. One third of the governing board of the party consists of the 
leaders of the Tatar national movement.The program of the "Muslims of Tatarstan" 
party noted that the party "will participate in elections to all state organs". Therefore, 
in case of elections it is very possible that the "Muslims of Tatarstan" party will form 
an electoral coalition with the lttifaq party. 
On the question about the purpose of creation of the "Muslims of Tatarstan" 
party, the chairman of the party Abdulla Galiullin stated: "In Tatarstan and many 
other Muslim republics some clerics agitate people not to get involved in politics. 
Arab clergymen, currently teaching Islam in Tatarstan, are of the same opinion. These 
people don't know that to be out of politics in Russia means to be out of life. We, the 
Muslims of Russia are surrounded by a Christian environment. Unfortunately, our 
society does not live according to the law of Islam, therefore we must obey civil laws 
of the state. To make these laws a bit useful and valuable for the Muslim population, 
there must be representatives of the Muslims in the legislative organs of the satte. This 
representation can be achieved only through active participation in the election 
campaigns. Therefore, the Muslims must have their own political parties and 
formations to participate in the elections. In Tatarstan, like everywhere in Russia, the 
process of politically organizing of the Muslims goes very slowly. In my opinion, the 
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Muslims of Russia and Tatarstan must be involved in politics to defend their rights 
through the law-making organs.We must make the laws of this state beneficial for the 
Muslims as well. For the Muslims living in the Arab countries and Turkey it is 
difficult to understand this situation. They think that after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union there is absolute religious freedom for the minorities in Russia. Today it is so, 
but tomorrow this freedom can be restrained. Therefore, now we must gain 
momentum and awaken all the Muslims."106 
When studying the revival of Islam in Tatarstan, it is necessary to point out the 
significant role of the nationalist parties in this process. Nationalism is an important 
factor in maintaining the influence of Islam. For Tatars Islam is totally identified with 
the idea of nation.The power of national sentiment in Tatarstan emerged even before 
the religious rebirth. Tatar nationalism is one of the most significant nationalist-
separatist movements of the Russian Federation. 
Today ethnically based parties in Tatarstan apart from asserting ethnic 
independence from Russian domination, are very much concerned with religious 
revival. Among the nationalist parties and movements mentioning revival of Islam in 
their program documents there are Jttifaq, party, the Milli Mee/is of Tatar People, and 
Azatzk Tatar Youth Movement. 
The reason of such intensive nationalist manifestation is the danger of total 
assimilation of the Tatar nation. Tatarstan is strongly influenced and penetrated by 
Russian people and Russian culture. As a result, Kazan Tatars are deeply linguistically 
assimilated by the Russians. Approximately 60% of the young Tatar population are 
deeply russified thereby loosing the national culture and language. 107 To the question 
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"Can you fluently speak your native language?" Only 49.2% of Tata.rs answered 
positively. Among the Tatar respondents 6.3% noticed that they couldn't speak their 
. 1 all 108 native anguage at . 
Kazan Tatars have formed important "diaspora" colonies outside Tatarstan but 
these colonies have been deprived of national schools and publications. There has 
been a steady assimilation of the Tatars living outside the national territories by the 
local nationalities and by the Russians. According to the general census of 1989, the 
Tatars are in second place after the Jews on the intermarriage list; 42.2 per cent of 
Tatar women and 40.9 per cent of the Tatar men marry with peoples of different 
. 1. 109 
nat1ona 1ty. 
To preserve the national and spiritual values of the Tatars living in Tatarstan 
and otside~ it was decided to establish an organ for all Tatars. In February 1992, the 
all-Tatars Congress was held in Kazan. At this Congress, along with other resolutions, 
the decision to create a Milli Mee/is, the national parliament of 7 million Tatars, living 
in Tatarstan and outside was adopted. 110 The main basis of the political activity of the 
Milli Mee/is is " the will of Tatar people, approved by the Kuroltay (Congress), 
concerning such questions as the self-determination of the Tata.rs as a single, united 
nation, the status of the Tatar language, development of culture and religion, etc." 
Despite its "informal" basis the Milli Meclis provides a fundamental political and 
national framework for the future Tatar generations. Both Milli Mee/is and lttifaq 
party have an extraterritorial authority. 
One of the unique functions of the Milli Meclis is adopting the laws for the 
Tatar nation. The Tatar Kanunu ("The Tatar Canon"), adopted by the Milli Meclis is a 
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sort of catechism for the Tatars to survive in an alien environment, without losing 
national features. The Tatar Canon is divided into seven chapters dealing with 
numerous subjects from culture to ecology. The whole document is strongly 
penetrated by the spirit of Islam. At the beginning of the document it is written that 
"The true Tatar must consider Islam as his moral and spiritual basis. He (she) must 
fulfill the five requirements of Islam". 111 
Another important document aiming the preservation of the Tatar nation, 
issued by the Milli Meclis is the "Family Codex". In the "Family Codex" the 
prerequisites of the formation of the Tatar family are described as follow: "Family life 
must be regulated according to the suras Nur, Nisa, and Loqman of the Koran." In the 
section concerning the methods of the formation of the Tatar family it is written: "The 
Tatar family is based on nikah. The procedures of nikah must be performed according 
to the ayats 23-24 of the sura Nisa, and ayat 2 of the sura Nur of the Koran."112 
The facts stated above show that the Tatar nationalism and religion two 
closely interrelated concepts. It is necessary to notice that the nationalist parties in 
Tatarstan have changed their tactics since 1990. If in the past the idea of state 
independence was the question of concern of the nationalist movements, today 
preservation of the Tatars as a nation is on the agenda. Under the current "soft 
dictatorship" of the post-communist Tatar government and chauvinistic tendencies of 
the Central authorities of Moscow, the idea of an independent Tatarstan seems to be 
unrealizable. So, under these conditions the leaders of the Tatar nationalist movement 
has realized that for the moment it is more important to survive as a nation. The 
survival of the nation is possible only through the strengthening of Islam. 
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Although not religion-based, the main opposition party lttifaq strongly 
supports a return to Islamic values. Today the lttifaq party operates under the slogan: 
"Devlet Beysizligi Milletde, Millet Beysizligi Iman'da", ("Independence of the state 
depends on its nation, independence of the nation depends on its faith, Iman" ). 
For the lttifaq party Islam is a vecy important determinant of the Tatar national 
spirit and morality. One of the articles of the party program concerning its objectives 
reads: "We call for the rise and spreading of Islam, for the unification and cohesion of 
all the Muslim peoples of the Russian Federation". 113 
According to Fevziye Bayramova, leader of the lttifaq party, Islam is the focal 
point of the Tatar revival. When explaining the policy of the party, Fevziye 
Bayramova stated: "For the Tatars returning to the faith, to Iman , to the traditions of 
Islam is a matter of survival. The Tatar nation is vecy sick. The Soviet regime 
destroyed the traditional framework of the Muslim family, and the Tatars fell victim 
of the process of Russification and assimilation. Today more than 400/o of Tatars are 
married to Russians. The children born from these families become Russified Tatars. 
Through the mixed families the worst qualities of the Russians such as alcoholism, 
robbery, sloth, degradation of moral values have passed to the Tatars. If the 
Russification continues in this speed, the Tatar nation will be on the verge of 
extinction by the next centwy. Islam is the only salvation for the Tatars. Koran 
prohibits intermarriage with the non-Muslims, it also prohibits the usage of alcohol 
drinks, and all other sins, haram. It means that the Tatars can survive as a nation only 
by returning to their origins, to their true religion. Islam is a religion of freedom and 
justice. Our mission is to explain the importance of Islam to the Tatar people."114 
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The program of the Union of the Tatar Youth Azatlzk, states that the political 
activities of the Union are directed towards the "recognition the role of Islam in the 
preservation of the culture of the Tatar nation'', and that the Union "desires to 
cooperate with all organizations whose aim is to save Islam and Tatar nation."115 In 
one of the articles concerning the political course of the Azatlzk it is written: "If one 
day a sovereign Tatar state, but without the Tatar language and Islamic religion, will 
be established, at the cost of disappearance of the historical traditions and best 
characteristics of the Tatar nation, if sovereignty implies this, there is no need for 
h . ..u6 sue a sovereignty. 
The appeal to Islam is a characteristic of many political groups in Tatarstan. 
Even the moderate political parties of Tatarstan accept the importance of religion in 
the development of the Tatar nation. Thus, the "Committee of Sovereignty", one of 
the social movements advocating sovereignty for Tatarstan, recognizes that Islam is 
the main basis of morality of the Tatar nation. u7 
There are also many other parties operating on a political scene of Tatarstan; 
the famous Tatar lctimagzy Ozek (the "Tatar Socio-Political Center") which has a 
strong popularity in Tatarstan, the nomenc/atura party Edinstvo i Progress, the 
centrist party "Republican Party of Tatarstan", branches of numerous Russian parties. 
It would be wrong to skip these parties over, just because they do not mention the 
concept of religion in their political programs. All parties in the Muslim republics, 
regardless to orientation, were formed to bring solutions to the problems, and each 
party has supporters among the Muslims as well. 
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The official relationship between religion and state in Tatarstan is outlined in 
Constitution of 1992 - religion and state are officially separate. Islam being 
historically a state religion of the Volga Bulgars and Kazan Khanate, today is separate 
from the state. Within this context, president Mintimir Shaimiyev has adopted 
moderate policies relative to Islam. Shaimiev's attitude towards religion summarized 
in the following words: "Granting a particular religion a status of state religion, 
would be discrimination towards the other religions in Tatarstan, so, the state policy 
of Tatarstan, is built on equal treatment of all religions and interests of all ethno-
confessional groups. For example, together with Kurban Bayram we made Christmas 
ffi "al h l"da "118 an 0 Cl 0 1 y. 
The Milli Meclis of the Tatar People appealed to the authorities of the republic 
with the request to ban the selling of alcohol drinks during the holy month 
Ramazan. 119 This petition was openly ignored by the authorities of Tatarstan. In 
contrast to Tatarstan, the President of the lngush Republic Ruslan Aushev issued an 
official Ukaz, (Decree) prohibiting the sale of alcoholic drinks during the holy fast in 
Ram 120 azan. 
The separation of religion and the state is well used by state authorities to 
justify their passiveness and unconcern towards religion. By saying that religion is 
separated from the state, the state authorities simply wave religious matter aside, 
refusing to build new mosques, print religious books, or train religious cadres. 
Therefore, the Muslims of Russia are compelled to build mosques, open medreses and 
train clergy mostly by their own means. Despite the fact that most of the religious 
establishments live only on personal donations of the believers (sadaka), and have 
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serious material difficulties, all of them pay high taxes to the state budget. All the 
religious establishments, mosques and medreses are regular tax-payers and kept under 
the control of the state. Apparently considering these measures to be insufficient, the 
Tatarstan's State Soviet (Parliament) is naw working on a law project to put tax even 
on sadaka, the main income of the religious institutions. 121 
Anxious about the independent existence of the Muslim societies, the central 
and local bureaucracy is most unwilling to grant too much freedom to the religious 
institutions.To take charge of religious affairs a Committee on Religious Affairs has 
been established under the Council of Ministers of Tatarstan. This Committee 
registers "standardizes" all the independent religious organizations and mahalle. 
Apart from creating bureaucratic obstacles, the Committee on Religious Affairs does 
not hesitate to meddle in the internal affairs of the religious organizations, provoking 
conflicts and deteriorating relations among the clergy. Thus ·this Committee has made 
several attempts to dismiss the head of the Religious Board of Tatarstan ( Diniya 
Nazareti ) Abdullah Hazret Galliullin by organizing alternative religious 
Congresses.122 
One of the common problems of the Muslim associations is the question of 
leadership. Since 1990 new spiritual administrations have come into being on the 
basis of each national autonomous unit. In Moscow, Saratov, Kazan, Ufa and Siberia, 
independent Spiritual Boards (Diniya Nazereti) have been established. But in some 
places the local religious committees, mahalles, though having their own Spiritual 
Board, are subject to the Spiritual Board of the neighboring region. Thus, the largest 
mahalle of Tiiben Kama in Tatarstan does not recognize the independent Spiritual 
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Board of Tatarstan and submits directly to Ufa. Such organizational disarray 
depends on political intricacies in the republics. 
The present Islamic establishments still remains weak, dependent on political 
leadership and abstain from introducing religion into politics. From one side the state 
organs impede the politicization of the Muslims, from another side the Arab 
missionaries (clergymen) agitate the Muslims to abstain from the politics. 
Unfortunately, many Muslim organizations are still exposed to such influence of 
these external factors. 
In Bashkortostan the religious revival goes more slowly than in Tatarstan. 
Historically the Bashkirs have been less religious than the Tatars. Today the spiritual 
authorities of Bashkortostan utterly rely on the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims, 
which is headquartered in Ufa. The location of the Central Spiritual Board in Ufa, 
however, does not speed up the process of religious revival among the Bashkirs. If in 
Kazan there are more than one hundred mosques, in Ufa this number does not exceed 
four or five. This fact can be explained by general indifference of the Bashkirs 
towards religion. No one of the Bashkir political parties emphasizes the importance of 
Islamic revival.Only the Tatar Democratic Party ldel-Ural, created on 11March1991 
in Baskortostan, stresses the importance of religion in the national revival of the 
Tatars. In its platform, along with the democratic principles and the cultural 
development of the Tatars of Bashkortostan, the party supports the concept of 
confederation of the Volga-Ural republics. 123 
On 17 January 1995 the Congress of the Muslims of Russia has been held in 
Ufa. Although the congress was conducted under the supervision of the Moscow 
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authorities, more than a thousand deputies from different regions of Russia 
participated in it.124 The main subjects of discussions were the disunity among the 
religious Boards, and the current position of the head of the Central Spiritual Board, 
Talgat Tacetdin. The Congress has adopted several resolutions condemning the 
violence in Chechnya, demanding immediate withdrawal of the Russian army from 
Chechen territory, and initiation of the negotiation process. One of the decisions 
adopted by the Congress was to give shelter to the orphaned Chechen children in 
Bashkortostan until the stabilization of the situation in Chechnya. 125 
Apart from religious establishments in the national republics, there are also 
many Muslim religious organization in the large cities and non-Muslim regions of the 
Russian federation. In Izhevsk, capital of the Udmurt Republic, a Muslim Society 
called Iman was established, in the city of Toliatti an "Islamic Socio-Political Center" 
was established. The "Islamic Cultural Center" in Moscow successfully serves the 
needs of the Muslim citizens of the capital. 126 In Moscow the Cathedral Mosque 
annually admit 600 new students to study Arabic and Koran. In 1994 the "High 
Islamic Spiritual College" was opened in Moscow, under the supervision of the 
teachers from Egypt and Turkey students from the different regions of Russian 
Federation obtain religious education there. 127 
Some of the local political parties in the regions mention Islam in their 
programs.Thus the Tatar Democratic Party of the "Ural Republic'', as the 
Yekaterinburg oblast calls itself, appreciate Islam as the main basis of the history 
and culture of the Tatar people, and supports efforts by the Muslim clergy in 
reviving the moral values of the Tatar people. 128 
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Today the Muslims of Russia undergo a process of general awakening. But the 
revival does not mean that all are converting to active participation. The values of 
Islam have not penetrated yet to the heart of each individual Muslim. Although firmly 
attached to their faith, only vecy small percentages of the Muslims live according to 
the principles of Islam.While many say that they are believers and participate in 
religious holidays and customs, far fewer actually participate in religious rituals such 
as daily prayers and regular mosque attendance. Thus, according to the survey, only 
25 per cent of the urban Tatar population observe religious rites, pray and regularly 
visit mosques. 129 In other words, the fulfillment of the religious duties lags behind the 
feeling of identification with Islam. 
3.2.The North Caucasus. 
Islam is the main unifying factor of the Caucasus peoples. The spiritual 
kinship of the indigenous inhabitants of the Caucasus is consolidated by their 
common religion. The overwhelming majority of the native Caucasian peoples are 
Sunni Muslims. During the years of Soviet rule the attacks on patriarchal traditions 
and Islam and "harmful religious survivals" in the Caucasus were made more 
intensively than anywhere else. With perestroika the potential revival of Islam in 
Muslim territories and, particularly, in the North Caucasus achieved official 
recognition in the press and state agenda of Russia. With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union the number of Muslim associations increased during 1991-92 from 870 to 4000 
(most of them in the Northern Caucasus).130 
Islamic traditions in the Caucasus differ from these of other regions by their 
remarkable pluralism. While in Tatarstan and elsewhere there is one official Muftiyat 
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(Spiritual Board) in charge of religious affairs, in Chechnya, there are dozens of Sufi 
authorities, and almost each clan has its own spiritual leader. In the Caucasus the 
preservation of religion was sustained through the so-called "parallel Islam"; an 
extensive network of the Naqshbandi and Qadiri tariqats. Since the traditions and 
practices of "parallel Islam" are very strong in the Caucasus, national front 
movements and political parties in many Caucasus republics are strongly influenced 
by the tariqats and other religious bodies. 
Moreover in the Caucasus certain traditional institutions such as the Council 
of Elders (Sovet Stareyshin) or Aksakals have authority and voice in the life of the 
nation. Almost all the Caucasus republics have their own National Congresses. Apart 
from this, many Caucasian nationalities have established popular front movements to 
defend their ethno-cultural interests. 
The methods of political struggle has been different in the Muslims republics 
of Russia.While in the past the Tatar's response to the Russian domination was in the 
form of cultural reformism and sophisticated political movements, the peoples of the 
Caucasus demonstrated resistance and unity around Islam through the Jihad. 
One of the most promising political organizations promoting pan-Caucasian 
unity was the "Confederation of the Mountain Peoples." The "Assembly of 
Mountain Peoples" was formed in 1990. The ultimate goal of the organization was 
the creation of the Caucasian Federal Republic. One year late on November 1991, in 
Sukhumi the Assembly was reorganized as the Confederation of the Mountain 
Peoples of the Caucasus, in which 16 Caucasus peoples were represented. One of the 
objectives of the Confederation was the establishment of independent government 
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structures among the nations of the North Caucasus.The national congresses of the 
nations, forming the assembly, have signed an agreement to support each other in case 
of danger. 131 
Surprisingly, the Confederation did not stress the importance of religion. 
Despite the fact that Islam has been the crucial element for the identity of the 
Mountaineers, the Confederation revealed its moderate attitude towards religion.132 
The Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus could have been a 
unique forum of regional cooperation, but due to numerous factors it could not 
became effective. 
In September 1992, the "Caucasian Round Table" gathered in Gromy with 
the purpose to create alternative Caucasian Confederation. In the opening speech, 
Chechen President Johar Dudayev stated that the pwpose of the "round table" was to 
create a new confederation to unite all the mountain peoples to resist the pressure 
from the side of the empire. The representatives from eleven Caucasian republics 
participated in the "round table". Representatives of the Ukranian popular front 
movement Rukh and ex-president of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia also attended the 
• 133 
meetmg. 
These were the only attempts to unite the peoples of the Caucasus under the 
auspices of single organization. After these two events, the Caucasian republics 
abstained from the manifestations of pan-Caucasian sentiments. Dudayev persistently 
conducted the policy towards the creation of a common "Caucasian Home" 
(Kavkazskiy Dom), leading to the creation of the federative Caucasian state outside 
the Russian Federation. But none of the official governments of the Caucasian 
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republics replied to this idea.134 Today each republic has its own separate way of 
development. 
One of the definitely Muslim territories is Dagestan. Dagestan divided 
between some thirty nations. As in other divided republics, national unity is only 
possible around Islam. It is a fact that the only deputy in the Russian parliament from 
the "Union of Muslims of Russia" party has been elected from Dagestan.135 The 
"Islamic Democratic Party" and the "Islamic Way Party" were first formed in 
Dagestan and Chechnya. General Islamic revival is clearly indicated in statistical 
figures: in Dagestan the number of mosques increased from 27 in 1988 to 5 000 in 
1994.136 Two main orders, the Naqshibandiya and Qadiriya are dominant in both 
republics. The socially conservative orthodox form of Islam is dominant in Dagestan. 
In terms of religious traditions, Dagestan is the most conservative region of Russia. 
There are numerous political movements of the ethnic minorities living in the 
republics. Thus, the A vars, Lezgins, Kumyks, Nogays, Laks and Chechen have their 
own popular front movements. The various national movements of Dagestani peoples, 
actively oppose the republican center. But no political party in the republic is pushing 
for national independence. Thus, the socio-political movement Birlik of the Nogay 
people, striving for Nogay autonomy, appeals also to the resurgence of cultural and 
moral values. 137 
Another active movement is the socio-political movement of the Kumyk 
people Tenglik. The organization was established on 19 November 1989 in 
Makhackala. Later, on 21 March 1992, the Congress of Kumyk people adopted 
decision about the creation of the Autonomous Kumyk Oblast (Region). 138 From the 
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very beginning the Tenglik party has been demanding federative re-structuring of 
Dagestan.In its program it stresses the problem of preserving of the cultural 
characteristics of the Turkic Kumyk people through the establishment of proper 
educational institutions. In 1993 at a scientific conference held in Ma.khackala, the 
Kumyk linguists adopted decision concerning alphabet change, shifting to the Latin 
alphabet. 139 
In Dagestan, Ingush Republic, and Kabardino-Balkariya, the religious 
holiday Ramazan and Kurban Bayram are official holidays. At a celebration of the 
birthday of the prophet Mohammed on July 28, 1996 in Ma.khachkala, capital of 
Dagestan, religious leaders from Dagestan and lngushetia and humanitarian 
organizations from all over the North Caucasus appealed to the Russian president to 
stop the war. 140 Dagestanis have not yet raised the issue of independence but their 
participation is strategically important for the future of the Caucasus. 
In the past in the Karachay-Cherkess republic there were few Karachay 
organizations such as Djamagat, "Confederation of the Repressed Peoples", and the 
"National Council of Karachay". The tough position of the Karachay organizations 
concerning the formation of a separate Karachay republic, has created tension 
between the Cossaks and Karachays in daily life. This confrontation lead to the crisis 
of power in 1992.141 
The fact that in the vast spaces of Eurasia the Caucasus has a special but 
controversial status is undeniable. On one hand the Caucasus plays a role as a bridge 
between civilizations of Asia and Europe, on the other hand it still preserves the 
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complex archaic culture, Jri.bal particularism, and societal self-organization that are 
capable of effectively resisting any outside influence. 142 
It is difficult to say weather all of the North Caucasian autonomous republics 
have the same aspirations, but the only force that can unite the Caucasian nations is 
certainly Islam. The events in Chechenia created a strong sense of solidarity among 
the Caucasian peoples, in not their governments. All of the socio-political, nationalist 
and religious movements of the Russian Federation expressed solidarity and support 
for the Chechen Republic during the war. The Chechens have earned the admiration 
of their neighbors, and the North Caucasus peoples have mobilized in support of the 
Chechens and in opposition to the Russian policy. 
Dissatisfaction with Moscow's policy on the Caucasus, distrust and tacit 
hatred of Russia caused by the Chechen war are growing among the peoples of the 
North Caucasus, which sooner or later will make themselves manifest. 
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4.1.Islam Returns to the Russian Political Stage 
Today Islam is returning to the political stage of Russia. The emergence of 
political Islam in Russia dated back to June 1990, when the Islamic Renaissance 
Party was created. Being an "all-union party" "Islamic Renaissance Party", 
(lslamskaya Partiya Vozrozhdeniya) was very active in most of the Muslim areas of 
the former Soviet Union. It claimed to express the interests of all Muslims in the 
Soviet Union. The ultimate goal of IPV was the creation of Muslim fraction in the 
USSR Supreme Soviet, similar to that which existed in the Duma until 1917. At the 
early 1991 IPV became the popular party among the Muslims and had established 
numerous branches in many Central Asian Republics and the Caucasus. 143 
The trend towards the unification along the Muslim and Turkic lines, has been 
continued by the creation of the "Assembly of the Peoples of East" on the Congress of 
the Peoples of the East. 144 The "Assembly of the Peoples of the East" consisted of 
numerous political parties and popular movements from all the Muslim republics of 
the former Soviet Union. The Assembly was the first political organization build on 
democratic lines aiming close collaboration of all the Eastern peoples of the USSR. 
The Coordinating Council of the Assembly consisted of such prominent personalities 
as Oljas Suleymanov (writer), Almaz Estekov (Kazakhstan), Abdurahim Pulat 
(Uzbekistan), Fevziye Bayramova (Tata.rtsan), Refat <;ubar (Crimea).145 
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The main objective of the Assembly was to defend the rights of the Eastern 
peoples living in the USSR, promote their cultural development, recognize the right of 
self-determination, prevent national conflicts, etc. Among the numerous documents 
adopted on the First Congress were the ·resolutions supporting the Gagauz people, 
elections in Azerbaijan, aspirations for state sovereignty of the republic 
Bashkortostan. One of the interesting resolutions adopted on the Congress was the 
Resolution No. 7 concerning creation of the national military units within the Military 
Forces of the USSR.146 The Congress accused the writer Soljenitsyn for his abusing 
chauvinistic statements in address to the eastern peoples, and blamed the speak.er of 
the Russian parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov for his incompetence and indifference 
towards the problems of the minority peoples. 147 The "Assembly of the Peoples of the 
East" was the first attempt to unite the eastern peoples under the auspices of a single 
political organization. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union this promising 
organization has been disbanded. 
The Russian society treated Islamic Renaissance leniently but without 
enthusiasm. In the minds of the ordinary Russians Islam was associated with 
backwardness, fundamentalism and even terrorism. Today despite the intensive anti-
Islamic propaganda in the Russian media, the number of religious establishments 
continues to increase. 
The idea of the consolidation of separate Muslim communities into one single 
political force came to the agenda in 1995. On the eve of the general elections to the 
State Duma the new parties, with the primary goal to participate in elections as 
Muslim political parties "defending political, social, moral and economic rights of all 
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Muslims living in the Russian Federation", were established.Today there are two 
officially registered Muslim parties of all-union character , operating in Russia. 
4.1. All-Russian Socio-Political Movement "The Union of Muslims of Russia" 
The first party on religious lines, the "Union of Muslims of Russia", was set 
up on 31May1995 and officially registered as a political party in June 1995.148 The 
Union describes itself as a secular party which does not support a fundamentalist 
program. The political aim of the ''Union of Russian Muslims" is to obtain "equal 
proportional representation of the Muslim people in the federal organs and in all 
spheres of public and political life." The highest executive organ of the party is the 
Congress (conference). In its First Party Congress , held in Moscow from 1-3 
September 1995, 250 delegates from 63 different regions of Russia took 
participation. 149 At the moment of establishment the Chairman of the party was 
Abdulvahit Niyazov, known in the political circles as a pro-Yeltsin figure. Now the 
chairman of the party is Nadir Hachilaev, the former karate champion and prominent 
businessman of Dagestan. While the leaders of Russia's Muslim republics are not in 
th ' l" h ad . . th . ISO e movement s 1st, many ave v1sers m e umon. 
The "Union of Muslims of Russia" claims to be the direct successor of the 
pre-revolutionary "Union of Muslims", Ittifaq-i-Miislimin which operated in Russia 
between 1905-1917 and had its own fraction in the State Duma. 151 But, it is unlikely 
that the "Union of Muslims" is able to perform such a mission. The political demands 
of the "Union of Muslims of Russian" are very abstemious when compared to its 
predecessor. The major points of its political agenda address to the cultural and 
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economic issues such as extensive economic assistance to the Muslim businessmen, 
encouraging investments to the Muslim lands, prohibition of nuclear weapons 
recognition of the major Muslim religious days as official holidays, etc. 152 
In the preamble of its program reads that the ''Union of Muslims of Russia" 
''will do everything in its power for the consolidation of all Russian Muslims for the 
common political and economic interests of Russia. " Further it continued : "the 
Union stands up for one united Russia, for the unity of all Russian Muslims, for the 
unity of the word and deed."153 
The political demands of the "Union of Muslims of Russia" are expressed in 
very general statements such as "to seek the extensive political and economic rights 
for the Muslims living in the national republics and regions of the Russian Federation. 
To seek 8doption of a state program of spiritual revival where the interests of Islam as 
the traditional faith for many peoples of Russia would be taken into account." 154 
The political slogans of the "Union of Muslims of Russia" are far from any 
radicalism. Only in its cultural program the party mentions the concept of cultural 
autonomy of national and religious communities living in non-Muslim regions of 
R . 155 uss1a. 
The political line of the "Union of Muslims of Russia" is build on the full 
cooperation with the Russian authorities. Since the "Union of Muslims of Russia" 
does not address to the important political and national issues, it is not expected to 
constitute any serious threat to political stability and territorial integrity of the Russian 
state. On the pages of its program the "Union of Muslims of Russia" by all means 
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reveals its proximity and loyalty to the Russian state and its governmental structures. 
156 
From its activities it is seen that the movement prefers to collaborate with the 
power echelons and official leadership in the republics. One of the first decisions 
taken in the founding conference of the ''Onion of Muslims of Russia" , was "that of 
all the existing (presidential) candidates, the most probable and best from the point of 
view of the "Union" of the Muslims of Russia is the current President 157• The 
"Union" also actively supported the Tatar president M.Shaimiev during the 
presidential election in March 1996.158 
At the moment of its creation many political analysts thought that the "Union 
of Muslims of Russia" was formed exclusively with the aim to gain seats in the 
Russian Parliament -or, at least, to assist well-known Muslim politicians to win office, 
so they could represent the interest of Russia's Muslim minority more effectively. But 
the "Union" s initial activities showed the opposite. After the failure to receive enough 
support to be placed on the ballot in the December Parliamentary elections, the 
"Union of Muslims of Russia" appealed to its supporters to give their votes for the 
Chemomyrdin's Party Our Home is Russia. 159 In the recent Presidential elections the 
situation was similar. The ''Union" rejected to support Aman Tuleyev, the only 
Muslim candidate in the recent Presidential elections, launched instead active 
propaganda campaign in support ofYeltsin's candidacy.160 On its tum Yeltsin and his 
team created "favorable conditions" for the propaganda activities of the "Union of 
Muslims of Russia". These reciprocal activities raised serious doubts about the real 
intentions of the "Union". Many highly placed religious leaders have distanced 
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themselves from the ''l!nion" - including Gabdulla Hazret Galiullin, mufti of 
Tatarstan, and Zamir Khairullin, mufti of the Central Religious Administration for 
European Russia and Siberia.161 In protest to the "Union"s support for Yeltsin, Party's 
Secretary Mukatdas Bibarsov resigned from the organization. 162 
The program of the party does not provide for a concrete way to achieve 
foreseen goals, therefore, the political line of the "Union" is a bit controversial. From 
one side it states that the "Union" is against the use of military force against the civil 
population. From another side it gives support to Yeltsin in the presidential elections. 
While all democratic forces and nationalist parties criticized Yeltsin and his prime-
minister for the reactionary, hard-line policy toward Chechnya, the ''Union" did not 
express any discomfort with regard to the fact that thousands of innocent Muslims 
have been killed during the military operations in Chechnya. 
In spite of some unclear moments in its political platform, in practice, the 
"Union of Russian Muslims" is a very active and fast-growing organization. The 
number of its regional branches is on increase. The "Union of Muslims of Russia" 
has officially appointed its own experts and consultants, to various Parliamentary 
Commissions and Committees. Direct involvement in legislative structures, gives the 
"Union of Russian Muslims" the opportunity to participate in law-making 
procedures. After the prolonged efforts, the "Union" managed to gain one seat to the 
State Duma. On 8 December 1996 the union's chairman Nadir Hachilaev was elected 
a deputy to State Duma from Dagestan. 163 Later the spokesman for the Union has 
announced the plans to organize a Muslim deputies' group in the State Duma. Most of 
the 26 Muslim deputies currently serving in the Duma belong to the pro-government 
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Our Home is Russia movement. Even if all of them joined the new group, it would 
lack the 35 needed to form an officially registered fraction. 164 Moreover the proposal 
on the formation of parliamentary group was opposed by the former deputy chairman 
of the upper house of the parliament Dum~ deputy Ramazan Abdulatipov .165 
The leader of the "Union of Russian Muslims" Nadir Hachilaev relying on the 
Dagestan's branch of the "Union" has conducted successful shuttle diplomacy 
between the Caucasian republics. To start peace negotiation process in Chechnya, 
Nadir Hachilaev and the Ingush president Ruslan Aushev have arranged meetings 
between Lebed and Chechen leaders Zelimkhan Y andarbiyev and Asian 
Maskhadov. 166 The ''Union" also has been taking active participation during the 
Chechnya war as well. Thus Nadir Hachilayev, the chairman of the Union managed 
to release many Russian hostages from the hands of the Chechen troops.It is 
interesting that the released hostages were not the civil people, but the soldiers of 
OMON. 167 
On March 1, 1996 in the city of Derbent the Union of Russian Muslims held 
a regional conference on the problem of the Russian-Azerbaijani border line, which 
divides 800 000 Lezgin people into the territories of two states. In this conference 
representatives of the South Dagestan delegated full authorities to the Union of 
Russian Muslims to negotiate on the name of the Lezgin people about the legal status 
of the present borders with the Russian and Azerbaijani authorities. 168 Today 
Moscow uses the problem of the Lezgin people and a "desire of the Lezgin people 
living in Azerbaijan to unite with its kinfolk in Russia" as a trump card to push 
Azerbaijan towards closer economic ties with Russia. Taking into account the high 
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level of religiosity of the _Lezgin people it seems that the Russian government found a 
good mediator for its state policies in the person of the ''Union of Muslims of 
Russia". 
The results of the "Union"s activities are patchy. The "Union of Muslims of 
Russia" faces many problems one of which is the question of leadership. Up to now 
dubious per8ons with inappropriate background ruled the party. Some uncertain 
points concerning the real aim of formation of the Muslim parties also leave room for 
various speculations.One of the most striking details is that almost all the Muslim 
parties, carrying all-union character, have been established in Moscow. 
4.2.All-Russian Muslim Socio-Political Movement Nur. 
Another Muslim political party that stands on the religious platform is Nur , 
the all-Russian Muslim Socio-Political Movement. Nur was established on June 16, 
1995. 169 It is the second officially registered Muslim political organization which has 
the legal right to participate in elections.In general, political platform of the Nur 
movement is similar to that of the Union of Russian Muslims. Within its general 
political program Nur has also legislative, military, economic, educational, cultural 
ethical and ecological sub-programs.Besides the local branches, Nur has under its 
premises the "Organization of Muslim Women and Youth", which is responsible for 
cultural and educational programs and deals with such issues as health care, sports, 
problems related with birth rate and motherhood. When compared to the Union of 
Russian Muslims, Nur is a rapidly-growing organization; as today it has already -
established more than 60 regional branches in the Republics. The Board of 
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i.airmanship of the Party is composed of 13 people, who are delegates from the 
rious regions of Russia. The highest consultative organ of Nur is the "Council of 
iers" (Sovet Stareyshin), as a symbol of wisdom and Muslim traditions. 170 In the 
:ent elections to the State Duma, Nur gamed 0.69 % votes and took the 22nd place 
lOng the 47 registered political parties which have participated and in the election 
Russia .. 171 For the newly-established religious party of the confessional minority it 
not so bad. The chairman of the party is Vafa Y arullin, a young religious figure, 
ot yet well known in the Russian and local political circles), was elected after the 
;ignation of the party's former chairman Ahmed Y ahin, who was accused for his 
sistance to a Liberal Democratic Party's Deputy. 172 On the question what is the 
fference between the Nur movement and the "Union of the Muslims of Russia" 
lfa Yarullin stated: "the "Union of the Muslims of Russia" is a civil society. It 
>rks as a branch of the Islamic Cultural Center in Moscow. Our movement is a 
rely political organization, to defend the rights of the Muslims properly we engage 
l "t" ,,173 pol lCS. 
In the Russian presidential elections, contrary. to the Union of Russian 
1slim Party, Nur supported the candidacy of the liberal reformist Grigoriy 
:vlinsky.174 In the political program of the Party it is said that Nur does not violate 
te interests of the Russian Federation. It is loyal to the state mechanisms of the 
lSsian Federation except for, the violations of human right , genocide and any state 
licy that provokes national tension and oppression of ethnic minorities. The program 
itains specific measures concerning religious education, business, revival of 
.tural traditions, creation of special funds for the Muslim students. One important 
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point in the program of Nur is related to the use of military force in the settlement of 
the regional and national conflicts. 175 In the light of this article, Nur protested the 
military involvement of the Russian forces in Chechnya.176 Nur supports the idea of 
the establishment of the organized cour8es for the pre-conscription trainees in the 
places of the compact residence of the Muslim population. It also supports creation of 
exclusively Muslim military units within the Russian army employed only by the 
Muslim personnel, so that the Muslim soldiers will be enhanced to fulfill their 
1. . d . 177 re 1g1ous uties. 
In general the program of Nur is build along democratic lines. Though 
claiming of being of all-union character, the Nur movement supports territorial 
autonomy of the Muslim republics. The movement opposed the federal government's 
intention to force republics to make their legislation conform to federal law. The 
deputy-chairman Hac1-Murat lbrahimbeyli said that the republican authorities know 
better how to express local traditions in legislation, while federal laws, including the 
Constitution, fail to reflect those traditions. 178 
One of the advantages of the Nur movement is that it has also sympathizers 
from the ethnically-based parties and nationalist movements in the national republics. 
Religion has worth in the eyes of the nationalist parties, because it helps to bind 
people together and gives them a feeling of solidarity. In the elections to the State 
Duma, Nur proposed approximately hundred candidates from the different districts of 
Russia. Two active members of the national movement of Tatarstan, writer Aydar 
Halim and singer Vafire Gizatullina were also proposed as candidates to the State 
Duma from the Nur Party.179 Although Tatar nationalist party lttifaq boycotted the 
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election to the State Duma on the ground that "the highest legislative organ of the 
oppressor state had done nothing for the improving the life of the Tatar people ", and 
appealed to the Tatar people not to participate in the elections, for those who wanted 
to participate in the suffrage, Ittifaq proposed to support the Nur party.180 In the 
interview to the newspaper Altzn Urda, singer Vafire Gizatullina, the candidate from 
the Nur Party, said that some nationalists accuse them for treason against the idea of 
independence of Tatarstan. "For us independence of Tatarstan has always been the 
primary goal, but today under the current circumstances it is hardly possible, so we 
decided to struggle for the welfare of the Tatar people from the federal power 
echelons", said Vafire Gizatullina in the interview. 181 
In 1996, after the presidential elections the position Nur began to deteriorate 
from its previous democratic line. To protect the Muslim community of Russia from 
the unpredictable consequences of the Lebed-Y eltsin alliance, the ''Nur movement 
became a member of the most chauvinistic Russian organization Russki.y Sobor. 182 
Under the pretext that Lebed saved Russia from the imminent danger of the new-
coming Communists, the Nur movement start looking for opportunity to cooperate 
with him. It sounds strange but today the Nur movement is a member of the 
chauvinistic organizations backing Lebed. 
In May 1996, "The Union of Muslims of Russia" and the Nur party decided to 
unite their power in a single organization to be named the "Union of Muslims of 
Russia" The Unification Agreement was signed in the capital of Dagestan 
Makhachk:ala. 183 Later, however for the uncertain reasons, two parties have split 
agam. 
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On April 13 1996, the Imam of the Saratov city mosque Mukaddes Bibarsov a 
bright religious leader, and former General Secretary of the "Union of Muslims of 
Russia", formed a new independent Muslim party named "Muslims of Russia" .184 
Although Bibarsov has good organizational skills and considered one of three most 
respected imams in Russia, it is hardly possible that he could manage to coordinate 
the political activities of the Muslims of Russia staying in Saratov. 
By the end of 1996, Duma deputy Ramazan Abdulatipov announced the plans 
about the establishments of a Coordinating Council of Russia's Muslim organizations. 
He said that the council will coordinate the activities of about two dozens Russian 
Muslim organizations. He himself will head the new council. 185 
As it is seen from the facts above the new Muslim political organizations 
emerge and disappear like mushrooms, making it difficult to follow up the course of 
events. Nevertheless all these developments show that the political culture of the 
Muslims of Russia is high enough to form political associations and seek 
parliamentary representation. One important question rises behind all these endeavors 
- how great is the power of these Muslim organizations to influence the Muslim 
electorate just through the "confessional lines"? 
Although officially Islam returned to the masses, Muslim population is deeply 
integrated into the Russian society. Despite the fact that Islam remains the main 
unifying bond between various Muslim nations in Russia, it is doubtful that there is a 
strong sense of belonging to one Umma. Russia is a huge territory , and under the 
current political circumstances it is early to place high hopes on the prospective role 
of Muslim representation in the Russian state power structures. 
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Russia, constantly playing "Islamic card" and exploiting the fear of Islam to 
stify its active presence in the Central Asian republics, will hardly resigns itself with 
e fact that the politicized Islam gains a basis ultimately in the Russian Federation 
:elf. Fear of Pan-Islamism has a long history in Russia. Ta.king into account the fact 
at today there are 20 million of non-slavic inhabitants still living in Russia, Yeltsin 
td his team spend enormous efforts and money to prevent the Russian Federation 
om further disintegration and collapse. 
For the time being nationalist movements in the autonomous republics 
elcome aspirations of the Russian Muslim parties for their contributions to the 
tltural and spiritual revival of the Muslims. But one fact raises doubts about the real 
Lture of these Muslim organizations, it is the active interest of the Russian authorities 
their growth and development. To create the illusion of economic and 
lministrative parity of the Muslim minorities with the dominant Russians, the 
JSsian government doesn't hesitate to use dirty tricks and political maneuvers. The 
o-governmental Muslim movements with unclear objectives may be one of these 
tmerous tricks, because for Russia it is better to see its Turko-Muslim subjects 
epresented" in its governmental power structures, than to let them secede. 
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Since 1990 the Muslim republics in Russia have experienced ethnic and 
religious revival. High interest towards the religion among the population lead to the 
significant increase in the number of the mosques, religious establishments, political 
parties along the religious lines. All those variables that can lead to the consolidation 
of different Muslim communities are present in the Muslim republics today. But 
despite this, the republics did not show any serious inclinations to mobilize politically 
on religious lines. So, what are those obstacles that hamper the unification of the 
Muslims of Russia? There are three main reasons of the lack of sense of the common 
Muslim identity among the Muslims of Russia. 
One of the factors that had the most profound effect on the Muslim 
communities of Russia is the so..called Soviet heritage. The common feature of this 
heritage is the artificially created administrative unit-republic and its governing 
apparatus. The moderate status quo regimes accompanied by the political indifference 
and apathy of the peoples is firmly installed in the republics. Post-communist 
governments in the Muslim republics have no interest in the strengthening of political 
Islam. They put up with the revival of Islamic traditions on the casual level, never 
allowing Islam and other popular ideologies to penetrate into the high politics. The 
ruling elite in the Muslim republics harshly resist the emergence of any political 
groupings that may challenge their status. 
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On unofficial level there is a strong feeling of solidarity among the Muslim 
political parties in the republics. The popular movements, nationalist parties, religious 
establishments are in close ties with each other. But the official governments lack 
such enthusiasm. The present leadership of the Muslim republics - the old republican 
communist parties - are anti-Islamic by training and political instinct. Five years of 
the post-independence experience showed, that the leaders in the Muslim republics 
have no intention to form political alliance and manifest all-Muslim solidarity. Under 
these circumstances it necessary to confess that the Muslim political union can 
hardly be realized under the present leadership in the Muslim republics. The official 
governments in the national republics are very reluctant to support each other fearing 
the reaction of Moscow. Some scholars correctly noticed that the Muslim regions 
were the most pro-centrist of any group of republics in the former USSR 186 
The lack of appropriate leadership capable to bring· the Muslims together is 
one of the urgent problems of the Muslim community of Russia. Traditionally the 
Muslim clergy prefer to abstain from politics. Almost all Muslim religious leaders 
within Russia support the idea of united Muslim community in Russia, but few of 
them consider it appropriate to achieve the unity by political means. The complete 
isolation of religious figures from politics restrict their impact on Muslims. 
In both the tsarist and Soviet periods, the state tried its best to be the only 
patron of Islamic establishments through the official Spiritual Boards. Today the 
republican leadership still wants to see the main religious figures appointed rather 
than elected. In some of the Muslim. organizations, (especially in Moscow, Kazan, 
Ufa) unknown, inexperienced persons were appointed by the state organs to the main 
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posts of the religious administration. It cannot be said that these people work hard on 
the unification of separate Muslim communities. For the central organs it is better to 
see the Muslim organizations disbanded and isolated from each other. 
The Soviet legacy of social problems, alcoholism, moral degradation, crime 
and corruption is a common phenomenon in all of the republics. It is hardly 
complimentary to the Tatar national feelings, if not blatantly outrageous to it, that 
Tatarstan state liqueur industry started producing a new sort of vodka named Altm 
~ 
Urda and Siiyiif?i/re.187 
Another important factor that overpowers the unification of Muslims is the 
prevailing ethnic allegiance in the Muslim republics of Russia. During the Soviet 
period everything was done to break up Muslim umma and create artificial Muslim 
nations separated from each other and deprived of their religion. Today the ordinary 
Muslim in the national republics associates himself with the nationality of his ethnic 
republic. For him his national republic is the only bastion of the traditional culture, 
the notion of universal abstract Umma, is beyond his perception. 
The ideal of adhering to all-embracing, single umbrella of a Turkic or 
Muslim nation existed among the pre-revolutionary Muslims, albeit with a strong 
adherence to other "sub" identities. Today, it is not easy to talk about such an 
affiliation. In the past, the Muslim peoples of Russia had an equal status within the 
empire, equal demands and one common opponent - imperial Russia. Today the 
situation is much more different. Today the Muslims of Russia directed their energies 
toward solving their local problems. Consolidation of each national community in its 
homeland overpowers the sense of supranational consciousness. Many strong 
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Muslim states such as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan (which were in the past 
under the common name of Turkestan) are independent states today. Those who are 
inside the Russian Federation have to cope both with the local and federal restraints. 
Islam in the Muslim republics toctay is very different from what it was before 
the revolution. Therefore, the political actions of the modem Muslims must be 
adjusted to the changing conditions of life. Before the Revolution the Muslims of 
Russia were busy with such problems as cultural, territorial autonomy, national 
education etc, while today different local political parties of non-religious character 
deal with these problems. If the question of state autonomy was raised by the Tatars 
on the First All-Russian Muslim Congress in 1917, today such issues are raised by 
the national-patriotic political movements, and considered on the Parliamentary level. 
Thus the Declaration on Sovereignty was adopted on the session of the Supreme 
Soviet ofTatarstan in 1990. 
No doubt, the political unification of the Muslims of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan 
and Caucasus would open a new page in the history of the Muslims of Russia. To 
form an effective association the Muslims of Russia first of all must have strong 
political consciousness and will to resist pressure from Moscow. Intensive national 
and religious renaissance is certainly not welcomed by the Russian authorities. Any 
attempt of the Muslims to unite on political lines is considered by Moscow as a threat 
to its territorial integrity. The Russian leadership knows that the future shape of 
Russian frontiers will depend on the political aspirations of its Muslim subjects. 
Therefore, being aware of the potential danger of such alliance, the Russian 
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authorities will do everything to prevent the real consolidation of its Muslim 
subjects. 
Despite all these negative elements obstructing political development of the 
Muslims of Russia, there is one peculiar_ factor importance of which is undeniable. 
This factor is a general Islamic boom that the national republics undergo today. 
Although the administrative partition of the Muslim community of Russia has been 
achieved, the bureaucratic methods of eradicating Islam during the Soviet period, had 
proved inefficient. Atheism failed to win the hearts of the Muslims of Russia. Today 
the Muslims of Russia are experiencing religious re-birth, approaching genuine 
Islamic traditions. The awareness of Islamic heritage is growing in all Muslim 
regions, and each Muslim republic acquaints with Islam all over again. It is necessary 
to point out that this religious revival among the Muslims of Russia is only on its 
initial stage. This stage is the stage of the profound comprehension and re-evaluation 
of the values of Islam. A rediscovery of Islamic roots is under way in all the Muslim 
republics of the Russian Federation. In some republics this process goes rapidly, in the 
others slowly, but phenomenon of the returning to the traditional, cultural and 
religious roots is present in all the Muslim republics. This gradually accumulated but 
restrained political potential will sooner or later reveal itself forcing the Muslims of 
Russia to make step further. Today is the stage of regaining of lost values, the stage of 
common actions will come next. 
The emergence of the first Muslim political parties on religious lines such as 
Nur and the "Union of Muslims of Russia" is the first sign of this initial process of 
the political revival. Though the creation of these two parties created various 
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speculations in the political circles of Russia and national republics, the presence of 
the Muslim parties on the political scene of Russia is already a serious achievement 
in the process of political awakening of the Muslims of Russia. What the Muslim 
political parties such as the "Union of the Muslims of Russia" and Nur do today, is a 
good indicator of the political maturity of the Muslims of Russia. There can be little 
doubt that eventually the Muslim political organizations will convince the Muslim 
nations of advantages of cooperation. The growing awareness of the necessity to 
mobilize on political lines is well reflected in the words of a young Tatar Muslim 
intellectual: 
There is need for unity of all the Muslims of Russia. This unity must be spiritual and 
ideological based on the genuine principles of Islam. All types of unity based on the 
temporary earthy benefits; material, political and others would distort the real Islamic 
values and real unity. The true union of the Muslims can be done only on the basis of Koran 
and holy principles of the prophet Mohammed. 188 
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